Analysis of the alveolar recruitment maneuvers applied at seven intensive care units

Introduction: During the past years, alveolar recruitment maneuvers (RM) have produced growing interest due to their beneficial potential in pulmonary protection, and have been introduced in clinical practice. Objective: To describe and analyze the knowledge of MR and its application at seven intensive care units in the city of Cali, Colombia. Methods and materials: Descriptive Cross-Sectional Study with an intentional sample of 64 professionals working in seven intensive care units and who apply MR. The self-completed survey was made up of thirteen questions, and the application period was two months. Results: Out of 64 professionals surveyed, 77.8% of them follow a protocol guide; 54.7% employes during RM the ideal Positive end-expiratory pressure (PEEP), which maintains a saturation > 90% and a PaO2 > 60 mmHg; 42.1% tolerates airway pressures between 35 and 50 cmH2O; 48.4% perform RM with a progressive increase of the PEEP and a low tidal volume. Conclusions: Regarding the knowledge related to RM, heterogeneity was found in the answers. There is currently no consensus about which is the most effective and secure way to implement an MR. This study can be the starting point to create awareness towards the revision of knowledge, capacities and abilities that are required to perform RM.

Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war

Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ëdistanceíbetween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: Öghting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the Öghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di§erent assumptions about the distribution of potential Öghters along the relevant dimension of conáict lead to di§erent equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies.