The Network is us

Larry Johnson, Presidente del New Media Consortium y fundador del proyecto “Horizon”, presentó, en el marco del V Encuentro Nacional de Rectores, la ponencia “The Network is Us”. Una exposición en donde se explica la importancia de implementar las nuevas tecnologías en el desarrollo académico de los colegios y las universidades.

Influencia de las creencias religiosas cristianas en la decisión de realizar suicidio asistido al final de la vida

El suicidio asistido como una posible opción al final de la vida, es una idea que hasta ahora está siendo considerada, ya que existen argumentaciones a favor y en contra que han generado controvertidos debates a su alrededor. Algunos de los argumentos en contra están basados en los principios de las instituciones religiosas de orden cristiano, las cuales defienden el valor sagrado de la vida de las personas y la aceptación del sufrimiento como un acto de amor profundo y sumisión a los mandatos de Dios, el creador. Mientras del lado contrario, se encuentran quienes defienden el procedimiento, impulsando la autonomía y la autodeterminación que cada persona tiene sobre su vida. La revisión de la literatura realizada no sólo permite ampliar los argumentos de estas dos posiciones, sino que también permite conocer la historia del suicidio asistido, la posición que este procedimiento tiene en diferentes países del mundo, incluyendo a Colombia, y finalmente se presentan las contribuciones de la psicología entorno al procedimiento en discusión.

Lethal Closeness: The Evolution of a Small-World Drug Trafficking Network

The evolution of the drug trafficking network –so-called– ‘Cartel del Norte del Valle’, is studied using network analysis methods. We found that the average length between any pair of its members was bounded by 4 –an attribute of smallworld networks. In this tightly connected network, informational shocks induce fear and the unleashing of searches of threatening nodes, using available paths. Lethal violence ensues in clusters of increasing sizes that fragment the network, without compromising, however, the survival of the largest component, which proved to be resilient to massive violence. In spite of a success from the point of view of head counting, the US’ socialization program for drug traffickers did not effectively change the cyclical dynamics of the drug dealing business: war survivors took over what was left from the old network initiating a new cycle of business and violence.

Allocation rules on networks

When allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing a resource through a network from sources endowed with the resource to citizens with claims. A link between a source and an agent depicts the possibility of a transfer from the source to the agent. Given the supplies at each source, the claims of citizens, and the network, the question is how to allocate the available resources among the citizens. We consider a simple allocation problem that is free of network constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed. The simple allocation problem is a claims problem where the total amount of claims is greater than what is available. We focus on consistent and resource monotonic rules in claims problems that satisfy equal treatment of equals. We call these rules fairness principles and we extend fairness principles to allocation rules on networks. We require that for each pair of citizens in the network, the extension is robust with respect to the fairness principle. We call this condition pairwise robustness with respect to the fairness principle. We provide an algorithm and show that each fairness principle has a unique extension which is pairwise robust with respect to the fairness principle. We give applications of the algorithm for three fairness principles: egalitarianism, proportionality and equal sacrifice.

Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene t, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis es an homogeneity condition then platforms pro ts and price structure have some speci c properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the speci c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platform s pro t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are a¤ected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.

A Network model of systemic risk : identifying the sources of dependence across institutions

We design a financial network model that explicitly incorporates linkages across institutions through a direct contagion channel, as well as an indirect common exposure channel. In particular, common exposure is setup so as to link the financial to the real sector. The model is calibrated to balance sheet data on the colombian financial sector. Results indicate that commercial banks are the most systemically important financial institutions in the system. Whereas government owned institutions are the most vulnerable institutions in the system.

Health care network formation and policyholders' welfare

We develop a model in which two insurers and two health care providers compete for a fixed mass of policyholders. Insurers compete in premium and offer coverage against financial consequences of health risk. They have the possibility to sign agreements with providers to establish a health care network. Providers, partially altruistic, are horizontally differentiated with respect to their physical address. They choose the health care quality and compete in price. First, we show that policyholders are better off under a competition between conventional insurance rather than under a competition between integrated insurers (Managed Care Organizations). Second, we reveal that the competition between a conventional insurer and a Managed Care Organization (MCO) leads to a similar equilibrium than the competition between two MCOs characterized by a different objective i.e. private versus mutual. Third, we point out that the ex ante providers’ horizontal differentiation leads to an exclusionary equilibrium in which both insurers select one distinct provider. This result is in sharp contrast with frameworks that introduce the concept of option value to model the (ex post) horizontal differentiation between providers.

Network externalities across financial institutions

We propose and estimate a financial distress model that explicitly accounts for the interactions or spill-over effects between financial institutions, through the use of a spatial continuity matrix that is build from financial network data of inter bank transactions. Such setup of the financial distress model allows for the empirical validation of the importance of network externalities in determining financial distress, in addition to institution specific and macroeconomic covariates. The relevance of such specification is that it incorporates simultaneously micro-prudential factors (Basel 2) as well as macro-prudential and systemic factors (Basel 3) as determinants of financial distress. Results indicate network externalities are an important determinant of financial health of a financial institutions. The parameter that measures the effect of network externalities is both economically and statistical significant and its inclusion as a risk factor reduces the importance of the firm specific variables such as the size or degree of leverage of the financial institution. In addition we analyze the policy implications of the network factor model for capital requirements and deposit insurance pricing.

Educación de la sexualidad, prácticas docentes y conocimientos de los estudiantes: una evaluación del Programa de Educación para la Sexualidad y Construcción de Ciudadanía (PESCC)

Este documento presenta los resultados del componente cuantitativo de la evaluación del Programa de Educación para la Sexualidad y Construcción de Ciudadanía (PESCC) del Ministerio de Educación Nacional de Colombia (MEN). Para identificar el efecto, la estrategia empírica explota la variación en la implementación del componente pedagógico del PESCC entre los colegios y la variación en el componente de fortalecimiento institucional del programa a nivel departamental. El principal hallazgo de este trabajo es que el PESCC mejora las prácticas docentes de planeación y los conocimientos de los estudiantes en servicios en salud sexual y reproductiva y en derechos humanos sexuales y reproductivos. No hay efectos significativos en otros índices de Conocimientos, Actitudes o Prácticas (CAP) de profesores o estudiantes.