Actions of resiliencia opposite to the housing policies in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina: the social organizations, the institutions, and the massive evictions

The current housing problems in the city of Buenos Aires revolves around two phenomena, the precariousness and the evictions, in a context that is conceived like housing emergency. In response to this situation, some institutional organisms and certain social organizations with territorial roots in the south of the city, began to take forward actions of resilience opposing to the massive evictions, which take place as consequence of the real-estate pressure, and were concerning to the hotels, pensions, tenancies, and usurped houses of this zone of the city. It will be analyzed the actions of resilience displayed by them in their individual and collective dimensions and their relation to housing policies.

Cambio político y consolidación democrática en México. Los límites del modelo de las transiciones a la democracia

 Este texto plantea una reflexión sobre el estado actual de la democracia en México. Para ello se basa en una lectura crítica de las interpretaciones de la transición mexicana. Estas últimas subrayan el carácter sui generis e incompleto de dicha transición, cuya conclusión no ha significado una discontinuidad clara entre la etapa autoritaria y la de consolidación democrática. Nuestro planteamiento consiste en mostrar que los límites actuales de la democracia mexicana, en parte identificables como problemas de consolidación, dejan dudas sobre la llegada de la democracia a México. Lo ilustramos en torno a la pluralización aparente del sistema de partidos, a la cual los actores y estructuras autoritarias han sabido adaptarse, y en torno a la débil consolidación del Estado de derecho y las instituciones, amenazadas por la ascensión vertiginosa del crimen organizado. La combinación de las recomposiciones autoritarias y de esas nuevas amenazas no se reduce a meras herencias autoritarias, en un contexto supuestamente democrático, ni tampoco admite la hipótesis de una transición inconclusa. Implica más bien una huida hacia delante, la cual oscila entre la democracia y su negación, así como entre las herencias del pasado y un cambio mal asimilado, obligando a revisar el modelo de análisis de las transiciones a la democracia, parcialmente pertinente, pero demasiado lineal y reductor.-----This paper proposes a reflection on the current status of democracy in Mexico. For this purpose, it has been based on an analytical reading of interpretations to the Mexican transition. They highlight the sui generis and unfinished nature of such transition, whose completion has not entailed a clear discontinuity between the authoritarian phase and the democratic consolidation phase. Our approach consists in showing that the current limitations of Mexican democracy, which are in part identifiable as consolidation issues, leave doubts about the arrival of democracy to Mexico. This is illustrated around the supposed plurality of the party system, to which the actors and power structures have adapted, and around the weak consolidation of the constitutional state and the institutions, threatened by the dramatic escalation of organized crime. The combination of authoritarian recomposition and such new threats is not a mere authoritarian inheritance, in what is a supposed democratic context, nor does it agree with the hypothesis of an unconcluded transition. It rather implies fleeing forwards, which in itself oscillates between democracy and its denial as well as between past legacies and a badly assimilated change, thus forcing us to review the analytical model for transitions to democracy which is relevant in part, but far too linear and minimizing.

Venezuela - Las elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela: de una democracia representativa a un régimen autoritario electoral

Desde 1958 hasta el presente el sistema político venezolano ha pasado de ser una democracia representativa, entre 1958 y 1998, para convertirse en un régimen autoritario electoral entre los años 1999 y 2006, durante la presidencia de Hugo Chávez. Este cambio de régimen ha tenido un impacto significativo y negativo sobre la institucionalidad electoral en el país, pues a diferencia del pasado reciente, los comicios en Venezuela han dejado de ser un mecanismo competitivo, con capacidad para expresar fidedignamente la voluntad colectiva y traducirla en esquemas idóneos de representación. En las páginas que siguen se examinan las recientes transformaciones del sistema político venezolano, su impacto sobre las reglas y condiciones del juego electoral, y las opciones y retos que enfrentan las fuerzas gubernamentales y las de oposición ante las elecciones presidenciales de diciembre 2006 en el marco del nuevo régimen autoritario electoral.-----From 1958 to the present, the Venezuelan political system has shifted from the representative democracy it was in the 1958–1998 period, to an authoritarian electoral regime from 1999 to 2006 under the presidency of Hugo Chávez. This change in the nature of the regime has had a significant and negative impact on the country’s electoral institutions and on its ‘institutionality’ since, unlike the recent past, elections in Venezuela are no longer a competition mechanism capable of reliably giving room to the expression of collective will and translating it into suitable representative frameworks. The paper examines these recent transformations undergone by the Venezuelan political system, their impact on the rules and conditions of the electoral contest, and the alternatives and challenges faced by both the government strongholds and the opposition vis-à-vis the coming December 2006 presidential elections in the midst of the new authoritarian regime’s electoral framework.

Measuring and testing for the systemically important financial institutions

This paper analyzes the measure of systemic importance ∆CoV aR proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009, 2010) within the context of a similar class of risk measures used in the risk management literature. In addition, we develop a series of testing procedures, based on ∆CoV aR, to identify and rank the systemically important institutions. We stress the importance of statistical testing in interpreting the measure of systemic importance. An empirical application illustrates the testing procedures, using equity data for three European banks.

A Network model of systemic risk : identifying the sources of dependence across institutions

We design a financial network model that explicitly incorporates linkages across institutions through a direct contagion channel, as well as an indirect common exposure channel. In particular, common exposure is setup so as to link the financial to the real sector. The model is calibrated to balance sheet data on the colombian financial sector. Results indicate that commercial banks are the most systemically important financial institutions in the system. Whereas government owned institutions are the most vulnerable institutions in the system.

Network externalities across financial institutions

We propose and estimate a financial distress model that explicitly accounts for the interactions or spill-over effects between financial institutions, through the use of a spatial continuity matrix that is build from financial network data of inter bank transactions. Such setup of the financial distress model allows for the empirical validation of the importance of network externalities in determining financial distress, in addition to institution specific and macroeconomic covariates. The relevance of such specification is that it incorporates simultaneously micro-prudential factors (Basel 2) as well as macro-prudential and systemic factors (Basel 3) as determinants of financial distress. Results indicate network externalities are an important determinant of financial health of a financial institutions. The parameter that measures the effect of network externalities is both economically and statistical significant and its inclusion as a risk factor reduces the importance of the firm specific variables such as the size or degree of leverage of the financial institution. In addition we analyze the policy implications of the network factor model for capital requirements and deposit insurance pricing.