The impact of a permanent Income shock on the situation of women in the household: the case of a pension reform in Argentina

Transfers to women may affect their bargaining power within the household and consequently their well-being. We analyze the effects of the 2004/2005 pension reform in Argentina, that resulted in an unexpected and substantial increase in permanent income for around 1.8 million women, on outcomes arguably related to women’s bargaining power within the household. We estimate the effects of the reform in the probability of divorce/separation, the distribution of household chores, and the probability of women being the head of the household, using a Difference-in-Differences approach. Our results show that despite the low divorce probability among seniors, transfers to senior women have substantial effects on their situation in the household. More specifically, we find that the reform had statistically significant effects on the probability of divorce/separation increasing it by 1.8 − 2.7 percentage points implying an increase of around 18 − 19% on the divorce/separation rate of 60 − 65 year old women. Moreover, the probability of being the head of the household also increased by 2.8−3.3 percentage points representing an increase of 7−19% in the probability amongst women of 60 − 65 years of age. In the case of married women, the probability of being the head of the household increased by 1.3 − 1.5 percentage points, which represents an increase of 20 − 22%. Results show that the distribution of household chores within the couples was also affected by the reform. More precisely, the probability that the wife is the only person in charge of the housework decreased by 5 percentage points, an 11% decrease. The participation of husbands in housework, however, did not change significantly.

Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war

Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ëdistanceíbetween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: Öghting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the Öghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di§erent assumptions about the distribution of potential Öghters along the relevant dimension of conáict lead to di§erent equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies.

Heterogeneity and the formation of risk - sharing coalitions

We offer a new explanation of partial risk sharing based on coalition formation and segmentation of society in a risky environment, without assuming limited commitment and imperfect information. Heterogenous individuals in a society freely choose with whom they will share risk. A partition belonging to the core of the membership game obtains. Perfect risk sharing does not necessarily arise. Focusing on mutual insurance rule and assuming that individuals only differ with respect to risk, we show that the core partition is homophily-based. The distribution of risk affects the number and size of these coalitions. Individuals may pay a lower risk premium in riskier societies. A higher heterogeneity in risk leads to a lower degree of risk sharing. We discuss how the endogenous partition of society into risk-sharing coalitions may shed light on empirical evidence on partial risk sharing. The case of heterogenous risk aversion leads to similar results.