A Strategic-Equilibrium Based

The strategic equilibrium of an N-person cooperative game with transferable utility is a system composed of a cover collection of subsets of N and a set of extended imputations attainable through such equilibrium cover. The system describes a state of coalitional bargaining stability where every player has a bargaining alternative against any other player to support his corresponding equilibrium claim. Any coalition in the sable system may form and divide the characteristic value function of the coalition as prescribed by the equilibrium payoffs. If syndicates are allowed to form, a formed coalition may become a syndicate using the equilibrium payoffs as disagreement values in bargaining for a part of the complementary coalition incremental value to the grand coalition when formed. The emergent well known-constant sum derived game in partition function is described in terms of parameters that result from incumbent binding agreements. The strategic-equilibrium corresponding to the derived game gives an equal value claim to all players.  This surprising result is alternatively explained in terms of strategic-equilibrium based possible outcomes by a sequence of bargaining stages that when the binding agreements are in the right sequential order, von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN-M) non-discriminatory solutions emerge. In these solutions a preferred branch by a sufficient number of players is identified: the weaker players syndicate against the stronger player. This condition is referred to as the stronger player paradox.  A strategic alternative available to the stronger players to overcome the anticipated not desirable results is to voluntarily lower his bargaining equilibrium claim. In doing the original strategic equilibrium is modified and vN-M discriminatory solutions may occur, but also a different stronger player may emerge that has eventually will have to lower his equilibrium claim. A sequence of such measures converges to the equal opportunity for all vN-M solution anticipated by the strategic equilibrium of partition function derived game.    [298-words]

Option pricing in market models driven by telegraph processes with jumps

Esta tesis está dividida en dos partes: en la primera parte se presentan y estudian los procesos telegráficos, los procesos de Poisson con compensador telegráfico y los procesos telegráficos con saltos. El estudio presentado en esta primera parte incluye el cálculo de las distribuciones de cada proceso, las medias y varianzas, así como las funciones generadoras de momentos entre otras propiedades. Utilizando estas propiedades en la segunda parte se estudian los modelos de valoración de opciones basados en procesos telegráficos con saltos. En esta parte se da una descripción de cómo calcular las medidas neutrales al riesgo, se encuentra la condición de no arbitraje en este tipo de modelos y por último se calcula el precio de las opciones Europeas de compra y venta.

Incremento de la salud financiera mediante la utilización de la relación estratégica comunitaria y marketing.

Debido a las crisis mundiales, la perdurabilidad empresarial se ha convertido en la primera preocupación de las organizaciones, puesto que los problemas económicos en otros países pueden generar un efecto negativo en las condiciones del mercado doméstico, que junto con el entorno empresarial complejo y dinámico en el que se deben desempeñar las empresas hoy en día gracias a la globalización, sumado al aumento en la competitividad nacional e internacional, la perdurabilidad de las empresas se está viendo seriamente comprometida. Lo anterior, ha llevado a las empresas a buscar nuevas formas de mejorar su salud financiera. Para medir la salud financiera empresarial, se pueden usar distintos indicadores como lo es el flujo de caja que está asociado con la rentabilidad, el patrimonio que está asociado a las dificultades financieras, entre otros, o a través de varios modelos de bancarrota, los cuales, por medio de un conjunto de ratios financieros, reflejan el estado actual de la organización y su probabilidad de fracaso en el futuro. Las estrategias comunitarias y el marketing permiten incrementar la salud financiera de las empresas a través de la orientación al cliente y el establecimiento de relaciones gana-gana a largo plazo con las diferentes comunidades con las que se relaciona la organización.

An artificial economy based on reinforcement learning and agent based modeling

In this paper, we employ techniques from artificial intelligence such as reinforcement learning and agent based modeling as building blocks of a computational model for an economy based on conventions. First we model the interaction among firms in the private sector. These firms behave in an information environment based on conventions, meaning that a firm is likely to behave as its neighbors if it observes that their actions lead to a good pay off. On the other hand, we propose the use of reinforcement learning as a computational model for the role of the government in the economy, as the agent that determines the fiscal policy, and whose objective is to maximize the growth of the economy. We present the implementation of a simulator of the proposed model based on SWARM, that employs the SARSA(λ) algorithm combined with a multilayer perceptron as the function approximation for the action value function.

Cartoons and economics: general analysis based on colombian economic cartoons

May cartoons be considered as a viable and credible source for the study of economics? There is hardly any research on the subject, even though there is a quite significant amount of cartoons with economic content. This suggests that economics (and economists) have not paid enough attention and do not incorporate in their analysis a relevant primary source. The present paper aims to explore the value of using cartoons as a complementary primary source in economic analysis. We present a way of analyzing economic history through cartoons; first, reviewing cartoons which describe particular historical circumstances and second, examining cartoons that represent generic economic situations and are not necessarily linked to a historical period. We choose 17 cartoons, from different cartoonist, especially Colombian cartoonists that may give us an idea of economic matters and economic history.

A Jump Telegraph Model for Option Pricing

In this paper we introduce a financial market model based on continuos time random motions with alternanting constant velocities and with jumps ocurring when the velocity switches. if jump directions are in the certain corresondence with the velocity directions of the underlyng random motion with respect to the interest rate, the model is free of arbitrage. The replicating strategies for options are constructed in details. Closed form formulas for the opcion prices are obtained.

Quantil Hedging for telegraph markets and its applications to a pricing of equity-linked life insurance contracts

En este documento está desarrollado un modelo de mercado financiero basado en movimientos aleatorios con tiempo continuo, con velocidades constantes alternantes y saltos cuando hay cambios en la velocidad. Si los saltos en la dirección tienen correspondencia con la dirección de la velocidad del comportamiento aleatorio subyacente, con respecto a la tasa de interés, el modelo no presenta arbitraje y es completo. Se construye en detalle las estrategias replicables para opciones, y se obtiene una presentación cerrada para el precio de las opciones. Las estrategias de cubrimiento quantile para opciones son construidas. Esta metodología es aplicada al control de riesgo y fijación de precios de instrumentos de seguros.