Tecnologías del poder: higiene escolar y educación física en los discursos médicos en la ciudad de Bogotá (1913 -1940)

La construcción del proyecto moderno en Colombia a principios del siglo XX fue un proceso basado en los ideales de industrialización y civilización. De igual forma estuvo atravesado por una serie de planteamientos de carácter científico que legitimaron un pensamiento racista que a su vez ayudó a configurar unas prácticas de carácter político y social encaminadas al “mejoramiento de la raza” en Colombia. En este trabajo se analizan algunas de estas prácticas a través de los discursos médicos sobre la higiene y la educación física realizados en Bogotá entre 1913 y 1940. En particular, se quiere explorar la forma como la educación física se configuró como una tecnología de poder que buscaba la construcción de cuerpos sanos al servicio de los procesos de modernización capitalista. Para esto, tomo como base teórica la propuesta de Michel Foucault con el fin de establecer la relación entre saber/poder como un constructo cultural que articula una serie de discursos productores de verdad propios de la modernidad.

Business cycle asymmetries: Loss aversion, sticky prices, and wages

In this chapter, the Smets-Wouters (2003) New Kenesian model is reformulated by introducing the loss aversion utility function developed in chapter two. The purpose of this is to understand how asymmetric real business cycles are linked to asymmetric behavior of agents in a price and wage rigidities set up. The simulations of the model reveal not only that the loss aversion in consumption and leisure is a good mechanism channel for explaining business cycle asymmetries, but also is a good mechanism channel for explaining asymmetric adjustment of prices and wages. Therefore the existence of asymmetries in Phillips Curve. Moreover, loss aversion makes downward rigidities in prices and wages stronger and also reproduces a more severe and persistent fall of the employment. All in all, this model generates asymmetrical real business cycles, asymmetric price and wage adjustment as well as hysteresis.

Competition between HMO and PPO: A Two-Sided Market Approach

We set-up a two-sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholderson one side and providers on the other side. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two-sided framework allows to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers’ side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of competition mainly depends on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO gets a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that our model, by highlighting the two-sided market structure of the health plans’ competition, provides new insights to understand the increase in the PPOs’ market share observed during the last decade in the US.

Energy saving innovations, non-exhaustible sources of energy and long-run: what would happen if we run out of oil?

We formulate and solve a model of factor saving technological improvement considering three factors of production: labor, capital and energy. The productive activities have three main characteristics: first, in order to use capital goods firms need energy; second, there are two sources of energy: non-exhaustible and exhaustible; third, capital goods can be of different qualities and the quality of these goods can be changed along two dimensions -reducing the need of energy or changing the source of energy used in the production process. The economy goes through three stages of development after industrialization. In the first, firms make use of exhaustible energy and the e¢ ciency in the use of energy is constant. In the second stage, as the price of energy grows the e¢ ciency in its use is increased. In the third stage, the price of exhaustible sources is so high that firms have incentives to use non-exhaustible sources of energy. During this stage the price of energy is constant. In this set up, the end of the oil age has level effects on consumption and output but it does not cause the collapse of the economic system.

Information provision in procurement auctions

We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante.