Don't make war, make elections : Franchise extension and violence in XIXth-century Colombia

This paper studies the effect of strengthening democracy, as captured by an increase in voting rights, on the incidence of violent civil conflict in nineteenth-century Colombia. Empirically studying the relationship between democracy and conflict is challenging, not only because of conceptual problems in defining and measuring democracy, but also because political institutions and violence are jointly determined. We take advantage of an experiment of history to examine the impact of one simple, measurable dimension of democracy (the size of the franchise) on con- flict, while at the same time attempting to overcome the identification problem. In 1853, Colombia established universal male suffrage. Using a simple difference-indifferences specification at the municipal level, we find that municipalities where more voters were enfranchised relative to their population experienced fewer violent political battles while the reform was in effect. The results are robust to including a number of additional controls. Moreover, we investigate the potential mechanisms driving the results. In particular, we look at which components of the proportion of new voters in 1853 explain the results, and we examine if results are stronger in places with more political competition and state capacity. We interpret our findings as suggesting that violence in nineteenth-century Colombia was a technology for political elites to compete for the rents from power, and that democracy constituted an alternative way to compete which substituted violence.

Behavioral differences in violence: the case of intra-group differences of paramilitaries and guerrillas in Colombia

In most studies on civil wars, determinants of conflict have been hitherto explored assuming that actors involved were either unitary or stable. However, if this intra-group homogeneity assumption does not hold, empirical econometric estimates may be biased. We use Fixed Effects Finite Mixture Model (FE-FMM) approach to address this issue that provides a representation of heterogeneity when data originate from different latent classes and the affiliation is unknown. It allows to identify sub-populations within a population as well as the determinants of their behaviors. By combining various data sources for the period 2000-2005, we apply this methodology to the Colombian conflict. Our results highlight a behavioral heterogeneity in guerrilla’s armed groups and their distinct economic correlates. By contrast paramilitaries behave as a rather homogenous group.

Psycological violence against women in Colombia

Although violence against women has gain attention, there is little evidence of studies about phycological violence against a partner. This paper uses data from Encuesta Nacional de Demografíay Salud (ENDS) to assess empirically models of violence against a partner. One of the main findingsis that the higher the economic independence of the women, the lower the phycologicalviolence against a partner. Some other results show that women with higher education level, belongingto a violent or low income family and living in cities different from Bogotá is correlatedwith higher probability of phycological violence.