Un marco analítico de la discriminación laboral. Teorias, modalidades y estudios para Colombia

Este documento presenta un resumen de las principales corrientes teóricas que han tratado de dar una explicación a la discriminación laboral, asi como una exposición pedagógica de las principales modalidades mediante las cuales dicha discriminación se manifiesta. Se realiza un particular análisis de las consecuencias que dicha discriminación tiene, en particular para el caso de los jóvenes de América Latina, y finalmente se realiza una revisión de los estudios que sobre el tema se han realizado en Colombia, sus aspectos metodológicos y las conclusiones a las que dichos estudios han llegado.

Works Councils: An Agency Perspective

This paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency framework in whichworks councils are supposed to monitor manager's information on behalf of the workforce,but they are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. First, we considerthat workers can incentivize works councils through contingent monetary payments. In orderto deter collusion, workers must pay higher compensations in states of nature where they canbe expropriated by potential coalitions among works councils and management. Collusionmakes contingent payments costly and reduces workers' payoffs. Second, when elections areused to align works councils' interest only well compensated representatives would face aninter-temporal trade-off between accepting management's transfers at first period and losingrents at the second period. Elections increase the cost of entering on collusive behaviour withmanagement and works councils will try to behave on the employees' interest.

Works councils: an agency perspective

This paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency framework in which works councils are supposed to monitor manager’s information on behalf of the workforce, but they are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. First, we consider that workers can incentivize works councils through contingent monetary payments. In order to deter collusion, workers must pay higher compensations in states of nature where they can be expropriated by potential coalitions among works councils and management. Collusion makes contingent payments costly and reduces workers’ payoffs. Second, when elections are the exclusive mechanisms to align works councils’ interest, only well compensated representatives would face an intertemporal tradeoff between accepting management’s transfers at first period and losing rents at the second period. Elections increase the cost of entering on collusive behavior with management and works councils will try to behave on the employees’ interest.

Entrepreneurship: a long way to go

Entrepreneurship education has emerged as one popular research domain in academic fields given its aim at enhancing and developing certain entrepreneurial qualities of undergraduates that change their state of behavior, even their entrepreneurial inclination and finally may result in the formation of new businesses as well as new job opportunities. This study attempts to investigate the Colombian student´s entrepreneurial qualities and the influence of entrepreneurial education during their studies.