Prices versus exams as strategic instruments for competing universities

In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices

Probabilistic models to assist maintenance of multiple instruments

The paper discusses maintenance challenges of organisations with a huge number of devices and proposes the use of probabilistic models to assist monitoring and maintenance planning. The proposal assumes connectivity of instruments to report relevant features for monitoring. Also, the existence of enough historical registers with diagnosed breakdowns is required to make probabilistic models reliable and useful for predictive maintenance strategies based on them. Regular Markov models based on estimated failure and repair rates are proposed to calculate the availability of the instruments and Dynamic Bayesian Networks are proposed to model cause-effect relationships to trigger predictive maintenance services based on the influence between observed features and previously documented diagnostics