Quantifying rock fabrics: a test of autocorrelation of the spatial distribution of cristals

A novel test of spatial independence of the distribution of crystals or phases in rocks based on compositional statistics is introduced. It improves and generalizes the common joins-count statistics known from map analysis in geographic information systems. Assigning phases independently to objects in RD is modelled by a single-trial multinomial random function Z(x), where the probabilities of phases add to one and are explicitly modelled as compositions in the K-part simplex SK. Thus, apparent inconsistencies of the tests based on the conventional joins{count statistics and their possibly contradictory interpretations are avoided. In practical applications we assume that the probabilities of phases do not depend on the location but are identical everywhere in the domain of de nition. Thus, the model involves the sum of r independent identical multinomial distributed 1-trial random variables which is an r-trial multinomial distributed random variable. The probabilities of the distribution of the r counts can be considered as a composition in the Q-part simplex SQ. They span the so called Hardy-Weinberg manifold H that is proved to be a K-1-affine subspace of SQ. This is a generalisation of the well-known Hardy-Weinberg law of genetics. If the assignment of phases accounts for some kind of spatial dependence, then the r-trial probabilities do not remain on H. This suggests the use of the Aitchison distance between observed probabilities to H to test dependence. Moreover, when there is a spatial uctuation of the multinomial probabilities, the observed r-trial probabilities move on H. This shift can be used as to check for these uctuations. A practical procedure and an algorithm to perform the test have been developed. Some cases applied to simulated and real data are presented. Key words: Spatial distribution of crystals in rocks, spatial distribution of phases, joins-count statistics, multinomial distribution, Hardy-Weinberg law, Hardy-Weinberg manifold, Aitchison geometry

Prices versus exams as strategic instruments for competing universities

In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices