Nutrient cycling and field-based partial nutrient balances in two mountain oases of Oman

Little is known about nutrient fluxes as a criterion to assess the sustainability of traditional irrigation agriculture in eastern Arabia. In this study GIS-based field research on terraced cropland and groves of date palm (Phoenix dactylifera L.) was conducted over 2 years in two mountain oases of northern Oman to determine their role as hypothesized sinks for nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and potassium (K). At Balad Seet 55% of the 385 fields received annual inputs of 100–500 kg N ha^-1 and 26% received 500–1400 kg N ha^-1. No N was applied to 19% of the fields which were under fallow. Phosphorus was applied annually at 1–90 kg ha^-1 on 46% of the fields, whereas 27% received 90–210 kg ha^-1. No K was applied to 27% of the fields, 32% received 1–300 kg K ha^-1, and the remaining fields received up to 1400 kg ha^-1. At Maqta N-inputs were 61–277 kg ha^-1 in palm groves and 112–225 kg ha^-1 in wheat (Triticum spp.) fields, respective P inputs were 9–40 and 14–29 kg ha^-1, and K inputs were 98–421 and 113–227 kg ha^-1. For cropland, partial oasis balances (comprising inputs of manure, mineral fertilizers, N2-fixation and irrigation water, and outputs of harvested products) were similar for both oases, with per hectare surpluses of 131 kg N, 37 kg P, and 84 kg K at Balad Seet and of 136 kg N, 16 kg P and 66 kg K at Maqta. This was despite the fact that N2-fixation by alfalfa (Medicago sativa L.), estimated at up to 480 kg ha^-1 yr^-1 with an average total dry matter of 22 t ha^-1, contributed to the cropland N-balance only at the former site. Respective palm grove surpluses, in contrast were with 303 kg N, 38 kg P, and 173 kg K ha^-1 much higher at Balad Seet than with 84 kg N, 14 kg P, and 91 kg K ha^-1 at Maqta. The data show that both oases presently are large sinks for nutrients. Potential gaseous and leaching losses could at least partly be controlled by a decrease in nutrient input intensity and careful incorporation of manure.

On Vessiot's Theory of Partial Differential Equations

The object of research presented here is Vessiot's theory of partial differential equations: for a given differential equation one constructs a distribution both tangential to the differential equation and contained within the contact distribution of the jet bundle. Then within it, one seeks n-dimensional subdistributions which are transversal to the base manifold, the integral distributions. These consist of integral elements, and these again shall be adapted so that they make a subdistribution which closes under the Lie-bracket. This then is called a flat Vessiot connection. Solutions to the differential equation may be regarded as integral manifolds of these distributions. In the first part of the thesis, I give a survey of the present state of the formal theory of partial differential equations: one regards differential equations as fibred submanifolds in a suitable jet bundle and considers formal integrability and the stronger notion of involutivity of differential equations for analyzing their solvability. An arbitrary system may (locally) be represented in reduced Cartan normal form. This leads to a natural description of its geometric symbol. The Vessiot distribution now can be split into the direct sum of the symbol and a horizontal complement (which is not unique). The n-dimensional subdistributions which close under the Lie bracket and are transversal to the base manifold are the sought tangential approximations for the solutions of the differential equation. It is now possible to show their existence by analyzing the structure equations. Vessiot's theory is now based on a rigorous foundation. Furthermore, the relation between Vessiot's approach and the crucial notions of the formal theory (like formal integrability and involutivity of differential equations) is clarified. The possible obstructions to involution of a differential equation are deduced explicitly. In the second part of the thesis it is shown that Vessiot's approach for the construction of the wanted distributions step by step succeeds if, and only if, the given system is involutive. Firstly, an existence theorem for integral distributions is proven. Then an existence theorem for flat Vessiot connections is shown. The differential-geometric structure of the basic systems is analyzed and simplified, as compared to those of other approaches, in particular the structure equations which are considered for the proofs of the existence theorems: here, they are a set of linear equations and an involutive system of differential equations. The definition of integral elements given here links Vessiot theory and the dual Cartan-Kähler theory of exterior systems. The analysis of the structure equations not only yields theoretical insight but also produces an algorithm which can be used to derive the coefficients of the vector fields, which span the integral distributions, explicitly. Therefore implementing the algorithm in the computer algebra system MuPAD now is possible.

Evaluating partial root-zone irrigation and mulching in okra (Abelmoschus esculentus L.) under a sub-humid tropical climate

The field experiments were conducted to compare the alternate partial root-zone irrigation (APRI) with and without black plastic mulch (BPM) with full root-zone irrigation (FRI) in furrow-irrigated okra (Abelmoschus esculentus L. Moench) at Bhubaneswar, India. APRI means that one of the two neighbouring furrows was alternately irrigated during consecutive watering. FRI was the conventional method where every furrow was irrigated during each watering. The used irrigation levels were 25% available soil moisture depletion (ASMD), 50% ASMD, and 75% ASMD. The plant growth and yield parameters were observed to be significantly (p < 0.05) higher with frequent irrigation (at 25% ASMD) under all irrigation strategies. However, APRI + BPM produced the maximum plant growth and yield using 22% and 56% less water over APRI without BPM and FRI, respectively. The highest pod yield (10025 kg ha^-1) was produced under APRI at 25% ASMD + BPM, which was statistically at par with the pod yield under APRI at 50% ASMD + BPM. Irrigation water use efficiency (IWUE), which indicates the pod yield per unit quantity of irrigation water, was estimated to be highest (12.3 kg m^-3) under APRI at 50% ASMD + BPM, followed by APRI at 25% ASMD + BPM. Moreover, the treatment APRI at 50% ASMD + BPM was found economically superior to other treatments, generating more net return (US $ 952 ha^-1) with higher benefit–cost ratio (1.70).

Institutions, Behavior and Evolution

The three articles constituting this thesis are for reasons of content or method related to the following three fields in economics: Behavioral Economics, Evolutionary Game Theory and Formal Institutional Economics. A core element of these fields is the concept of individual preferences. Preferences are of central importance for the conceptional framework to analyze human behavior. They form the foundation for the theory of rational choice which is defined by the determination of the choice set and the selection of the most preferred alternative according to some consistency requirements. The theory of rational choice is based on a very simplified description of the problem of choice (object function and constraints). However, that choices depend on many more factors is for instance propagated by psychological theories and is supported by many empirical and experimental studies. This thesis adds to a better understanding of individual behavior to the extent that the evolution of certain characteristics of preferences and their consequences on human behavior forms the overarching theme of the dissertation. The long-term effect of evolutionary forces on a particular characteristic of importance in the theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature, the concept of inequality aversion, is subject of the article “The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life” (Chapter 4). The contribution of the article is the overcoming of a restriction of former approaches to analyze the evolution of preferences in very simple environments. By classifying human interaction into three central economic games, the article provides a first step towards a simplified and sufficiently complete description of the interaction environment. Within such an environment the article characterizes the evolutionary stable preference distribution. One result shows, that the interaction of the aforementioned three classes can stabilize a preference of inequality aversion in the subpopulation which is favored in the problem of redistribution. The two remaining articles are concerned with social norms, which dissemination is determined by medium-run forces of cultural evolution. The article “The impact of market innovations on the evolution of social norms: the sustainability case.“ (Chapter 2) studies the interrelation between product innovations which are relevant from a sustainability perspective and an according social norm in consumption. This relation is based on a conformity bias in consumption and the attempt to avoid cognitive dissonances resulting from non-compliant consumption. Among others, it is shown that a conformity bias on the consumption side can lead to multiple equilibria on the side of norm adoption. The article “Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas: signaling internalized norms.” (Chapter 3) studies the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas based on the signaling of social norms. The article provides a potential explanation of cooperative behavior, which does not rely on the assumption of structured populations or on the unmotivated ability of social norms to restrict individual actions or strategy spaces. A comprehensive result of the single articles is the explanation of the phenomenon of partial norm adaption or dissemination of preferences. The plurality of the applied approaches with respect to the proximity to the rational choice approach and regarding the underlying evolutionary mechanics is a particular strength of the thesis. It shows the equality of these approaches in their potential to explain the phenomenon of cooperation in environments that provide material incentives for defective behavior. This also points to the need of a unified framework considering the biological and cultural coevolution of preference patterns.