Higher Education Governance in Vietnam: University Action, the State and Changing Relationships

Diese Dissertation stellt eine Studie da, welche sich mit den Änderungen in der Governance der Hochschulbildung in Vietnam beschäftigt. Das zentrale Ziel dieser Forschungsarbeit ist die Untersuchung der Herkunft und Änderung in der Beziehung der Mächte zwischen dem vietnamesischen Staat und den Hochschulbildungsinstituten (HI), welche hauptsächlich aus der Interaktion dieser beiden Akteure resultiert. Die Macht dieser beiden Akteure wurde im sozialen Bereich konstruiert und ist hauptsächlich durch ihre Nützlichkeit und Beiträge für die Hochschulbildung bestimmt. Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich dabei besonders mit dem Aspekt der Lehrqualität. Diese Studie nimmt dabei die Perspektive einer allgemeinen Governance ein, um die Beziehung zwischen Staat und HI zu erforschen. Zudem verwendet sie die „Resource Dependence Theory“ (RDT), um das Verhalten der HI in Bezug auf die sich verändernde Umgebung zu untersuchen, welche durch die Politik und eine abnehmende Finanzierung charakterisiert ist. Durch eine empirische Untersuchung der Regierungspolitik sowie der internen Steuerung und den Praktiken der vier führenden Universitäten kommt die Studie zu dem Schluss, dass unter Berücksichtigung des Drucks der Schaffung von Einkommen die vietnamesischen Universitäten sowohl Strategien als auch Taktiken entwickelt haben, um Ressourcenflüsse und Legitimität zu kontrollieren. Die Entscheidungs- und Zielfindung der Komitees, die aus einer Mehrheit von Akademikern bestehen, sind dabei mächtiger als die der Manager. Daher werden bei initiativen Handlungen der Universitäten größtenteils Akademiker mit einbezogen. Gestützt auf die sich entwickelnden Muster der Ressourcenbeiträge von Akademikern und Studierenden für die Hochschulbildung prognostiziert die Studie eine aufstrebende Governance Konfiguration, bei der die Dimensionen der akademischen Selbstverwaltung und des Wettbewerbsmarktes stärker werden und die Regulation des Staates rational zunimmt. Das derzeitige institutionelle Design und administrative System des Landes, die spezifische Gewichtung und die Koordinationsmechanismen, auch als sogenanntes effektives Aufsichtssystem zwischen den drei Schlüsselakteuren - der Staat, die HI/Akademiker und die Studierenden – bezeichnet, brauchen eine lange Zeit zur Detektion und Etablierung. In der aktuellen Phase der Suche nach einem solchen System sollte die Regierung Management-Tools stärken, wie zum Beispiel die Akkreditierung, belohnende und marktbasierte Instrumente und das Treffen informations-basierter Entscheidungen. Darüber hinaus ist es notwendig die Transparenz der Politik zu erhöhen und mehr Informationen offenzulegen.

Individual Decision-Making and Inflation Persistence

The traditional task of a central bank is to preserve price stability and, in doing so, not to impair the real economy more than necessary. To meet this challenge, it is of great relevance whether inflation is only driven by inflation expectations and the current output gap or whether it is, in addition, influenced by past inflation. In the former case, as described by the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the central bank can immediately and simultaneously achieve price stability and equilibrium output, the so-called ‘divine coincidence’ (Blanchard and Galí 2007). In the latter case, the achievement of price stability is costly in terms of output and will be pursued over several periods. Similarly, it is important to distinguish this latter case, which describes ‘intrinsic’ inflation persistence, from that of ‘extrinsic’ inflation persistence, where the sluggishness of inflation is not a ‘structural’ feature of the economy but merely ‘inherited’ from the sluggishness of the other driving forces, inflation expectations and output. ‘Extrinsic’ inflation persistence is usually considered to be the less challenging case, as policy-makers are supposed to fight against the persistence in the driving forces, especially to reduce the stickiness of inflation expectations by a credible monetary policy, in order to reestablish the ‘divine coincidence’. The scope of this dissertation is to contribute to the vast literature and ongoing discussion on inflation persistence: Chapter 1 describes the policy consequences of inflation persistence and summarizes the empirical and theoretical literature. Chapter 2 compares two models of staggered price setting, one with a fixed two-period duration and the other with a stochastic duration of prices. I show that in an economy with a timeless optimizing central bank the model with the two-period alternating price-setting (for most parameter values) leads to more persistent inflation than the model with stochastic price duration. This result amends earlier work by Kiley (2002) who found that the model with stochastic price duration generates more persistent inflation in response to an exogenous monetary shock. Chapter 3 extends the two-period alternating price-setting model to the case of 3- and 4-period price durations. This results in a more complex Phillips curve with a negative impact of past inflation on current inflation. As simulations show, this multi-period Phillips curve generates a too low degree of autocorrelation and too early turnings points of inflation and is outperformed by a simple Hybrid Phillips curve. Chapter 4 starts from the critique of Driscoll and Holden (2003) on the relative real-wage model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995). While taking the critique seriously that Fuhrer and Moore’s model will collapse to a much simpler one without intrinsic inflation persistence if one takes their arguments literally, I extend the model by a term for inequality aversion. This model extension is not only in line with experimental evidence but results in a Hybrid Phillips curve with inflation persistence that is observably equivalent to that presented by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). In chapter 5, I present a model that especially allows to study the relationship between fairness attitudes and time preference (impatience). In the model, two individuals take decisions in two subsequent periods. In period 1, both individuals are endowed with resources and are able to donate a share of their resources to the other individual. In period 2, the two individuals might join in a common production after having bargained on the split of its output. The size of the production output depends on the relative share of resources at the end of period 1 as the human capital of the individuals, which is built by means of their resources, cannot fully be substituted one against each other. Therefore, it might be rational for a well-endowed individual in period 1 to act in a seemingly ‘fair’ manner and to donate own resources to its poorer counterpart. This decision also depends on the individuals’ impatience which is induced by the small but positive probability that production is not possible in period 2. As a general result, the individuals in the model economy are more likely to behave in a ‘fair’ manner, i.e., to donate resources to the other individual, the lower their own impatience and the higher the productivity of the other individual. As the (seemingly) ‘fair’ behavior is modelled as an endogenous outcome and as it is related to the aspect of time preference, the presented framework might help to further integrate behavioral economics and macroeconomics.

Farmers’ knowledge and perceptions of potato pests and their management in Uganda

As we initiate entomological research on potato (Solanum tuberosum L.) in Uganda, there is need to understand farmers’ knowledge of existing insect pest problems and their management practices. Such information is important for designing a suitable intervention and successful integrated pest management (IPM) strategy. A farm household survey using a structured questionnaire was conducted among 204 potato farmers in six districts of Uganda (i.e., Kabale, Kisoro, Mbale, Kapchorwa, Mubende, and Kyegegwa) during August and September 2013. Diseases, insect pests, price fluctuations, and low market prices were the four highest ranked constraints in potato production, in order of decreasing importance. Cutworms (Agrotis spp.), aphids (Myzus persicae (Sulzer)), and potato tuber moth (Phthorimaea operculella (Zeller)) were the three most severe insect pests. Ants (Dorylis orantalis Westwood), whiteflies (Bemisia tabaci (Gennadius)), and leafminer flies (Liriomyza huidobrensis (Blanchard)) were pests of moderate importance. Major yield losses are predominantly due to late blight (Phytophthora infestans (Mont.) de Bary) and reached 100% without chemical control in the districts of Kabale, Kisoro, Mbale, and Kapchorwa. On average, farmers had little to moderate knowledge about pest characteristics. The predominant control methods were use of fungicides (72% of respondents) and insecticides (62% of respondents). On average, only 5% of the 204 farmers knew about insect pests and their natural enemies. This lack of knowledge calls for training of both farmers and extension workers in insect pest identification, their biology, and control. Empowering farmers with knowledge about insect pests is essential for the reduction of pesticide misuse and uptake of more environmentally friendly approaches like IPM. Field surveys would need follow-up in order to assess the actual field infestation rates and intensities of each insect pest and compare the results with the responses received from farmers.