Bieberbach's Conjecture, the de Branges and Weinstein Functions and the Askey-Gasper Inequality

The Bieberbach conjecture about the coefficients of univalent functions of the unit disk was formulated by Ludwig Bieberbach in 1916 [Bieberbach1916]. The conjecture states that the coefficients of univalent functions are majorized by those of the Koebe function which maps the unit disk onto a radially slit plane. The Bieberbach conjecture was quite a difficult problem, and it was surprisingly proved by Louis de Branges in 1984 [deBranges1985] when some experts were rather trying to disprove it. It turned out that an inequality of Askey and Gasper [AskeyGasper1976] about certain hypergeometric functions played a crucial role in de Branges' proof. In this article I describe the historical development of the conjecture and the main ideas that led to the proof. The proof of Lenard Weinstein (1991) [Weinstein1991] follows, and it is shown how the two proofs are interrelated. Both proofs depend on polynomial systems that are directly related with the Koebe function. At this point algorithms of computer algebra come into the play, and computer demonstrations are given that show how important parts of the proofs can be automated.

Social Inequality and Social Policy outside the OECD

Almost all Latin American countries are still marked by extreme forms of social inequality – and to an extent, this seems to be the case regardless of national differences in the economic development model or the strength of democracy and the welfare state. Recent research highlights the fact that the heterogeneous labour markets in the region are a key source of inequality. At the same time, there is a strengthening of ‘exclusive’ social policy, which is located at the fault lines of the labour market and is constantly (re-)producing market-mediated disparities. In the last three decades, this type of social policy has even enjoyed democratic legitimacy. These dynamics challenge many of the assumptions guiding social policy and democratic theory, which often attempt to account for the specificities of the region by highlighting the purported flaws of certain policies. We suggest taking a different perspective: social policy in Latin American should not be grasped as a deficient or flawed type of social policy, but as a very successful relation of political domination. ‘Relational social analysis’ locates social policy in the ‘tension zone’ constituted by the requirements of economic reproduction, demands for democratic legitimacy and the relative autonomy of the state. From this vantage point, we will make the relation of domination in question accessible for empirical research. It seems particularly useful for this purpose to examine the recent shifts in the Latin American labour markets, which have undergone numerous reforms. We will examine which mechanisms, institutions and constellations of actors block or activate the potentials of redistribution inherent in such processes of political reform. This will enable us to explore the socio-political field of forces that has been perpetuating the social inequalities in Latin America for generations.