Decision‐Making in Public Good Dilemmas: Theory and Agent‐Based Simulation

In many real world contexts individuals find themselves in situations where they have to decide between options of behaviour that serve a collective purpose or behaviours which satisfy one’s private interests, ignoring the collective. In some cases the underlying social dilemma (Dawes, 1980) is solved and we observe collective action (Olson, 1965). In others social mobilisation is unsuccessful. The central topic of social dilemma research is the identification and understanding of mechanisms which yield to the observed cooperation and therefore resolve the social dilemma. It is the purpose of this thesis to contribute this research field for the case of public good dilemmas. To do so, existing work that is relevant to this problem domain is reviewed and a set of mandatory requirements is derived which guide theory and method development of the thesis. In particular, the thesis focusses on dynamic processes of social mobilisation which can foster or inhibit collective action. The basic understanding is that success or failure of the required process of social mobilisation is determined by heterogeneous individual preferences of the members of a providing group, the social structure in which the acting individuals are contained, and the embedding of the individuals in economic, political, biophysical, or other external contexts. To account for these aspects and for the involved dynamics the methodical approach of the thesis is computer simulation, in particular agent-based modelling and simulation of social systems. Particularly conductive are agent models which ground the simulation of human behaviour in suitable psychological theories of action. The thesis develops the action theory HAPPenInGS (Heterogeneous Agents Providing Public Goods) and demonstrates its embedding into different agent-based simulations. The thesis substantiates the particular added value of the methodical approach: Starting out from a theory of individual behaviour, in simulations the emergence of collective patterns of behaviour becomes observable. In addition, the underlying collective dynamics may be scrutinised and assessed by scenario analysis. The results of such experiments reveal insights on processes of social mobilisation which go beyond classical empirical approaches and yield policy recommendations on promising intervention measures in particular.

Decision Making for Teams of Mobile Robots

In the past years, we could observe a significant amount of new robotic systems in science, industry, and everyday life. To reduce the complexity of these systems, the industry constructs robots that are designated for the execution of a specific task such as vacuum cleaning, autonomous driving, observation, or transportation operations. As a result, such robotic systems need to combine their capabilities to accomplish complex tasks that exceed the abilities of individual robots. However, to achieve emergent cooperative behavior, multi-robot systems require a decision process that copes with the communication challenges of the application domain. This work investigates a distributed multi-robot decision process, which addresses unreliable and transient communication. This process composed by five steps, which we embedded into the ALICA multi-agent coordination language guided by the PROViDE negotiation middleware. The first step encompasses the specification of the decision problem, which is an integral part of the ALICA implementation. In our decision process, we describe multi-robot problems by continuous nonlinear constraint satisfaction problems. The second step addresses the calculation of solution proposals for this problem specification. Here, we propose an efficient solution algorithm that integrates incomplete local search and interval propagation techniques into a satisfiability solver, which forms a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver. In the third decision step, the PROViDE middleware replicates the solution proposals among the robots. This replication process is parameterized with a distribution method, which determines the consistency properties of the proposals. In a fourth step, we investigate the conflict resolution. Therefore, an acceptance method ensures that each robot supports one of the replicated proposals. As we integrated the conflict resolution into the replication process, a sound selection of the distribution and acceptance methods leads to an eventual convergence of the robot proposals. In order to avoid the execution of conflicting proposals, the last step comprises a decision method, which selects a proposal for implementation in case the conflict resolution fails. The evaluation of our work shows that the usage of incomplete solution techniques of the constraint satisfaction solver outperforms the runtime of other state-of-the-art approaches for many typical robotic problems. We further show by experimental setups and practical application in the RoboCup environment that our decision process is suitable for making quick decisions in the presence of packet loss and delay. Moreover, PROViDE requires less memory and bandwidth compared to other state-of-the-art middleware approaches.

Individual Decision-Making and Inflation Persistence

The traditional task of a central bank is to preserve price stability and, in doing so, not to impair the real economy more than necessary. To meet this challenge, it is of great relevance whether inflation is only driven by inflation expectations and the current output gap or whether it is, in addition, influenced by past inflation. In the former case, as described by the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the central bank can immediately and simultaneously achieve price stability and equilibrium output, the so-called ‘divine coincidence’ (Blanchard and Galí 2007). In the latter case, the achievement of price stability is costly in terms of output and will be pursued over several periods. Similarly, it is important to distinguish this latter case, which describes ‘intrinsic’ inflation persistence, from that of ‘extrinsic’ inflation persistence, where the sluggishness of inflation is not a ‘structural’ feature of the economy but merely ‘inherited’ from the sluggishness of the other driving forces, inflation expectations and output. ‘Extrinsic’ inflation persistence is usually considered to be the less challenging case, as policy-makers are supposed to fight against the persistence in the driving forces, especially to reduce the stickiness of inflation expectations by a credible monetary policy, in order to reestablish the ‘divine coincidence’. The scope of this dissertation is to contribute to the vast literature and ongoing discussion on inflation persistence: Chapter 1 describes the policy consequences of inflation persistence and summarizes the empirical and theoretical literature. Chapter 2 compares two models of staggered price setting, one with a fixed two-period duration and the other with a stochastic duration of prices. I show that in an economy with a timeless optimizing central bank the model with the two-period alternating price-setting (for most parameter values) leads to more persistent inflation than the model with stochastic price duration. This result amends earlier work by Kiley (2002) who found that the model with stochastic price duration generates more persistent inflation in response to an exogenous monetary shock. Chapter 3 extends the two-period alternating price-setting model to the case of 3- and 4-period price durations. This results in a more complex Phillips curve with a negative impact of past inflation on current inflation. As simulations show, this multi-period Phillips curve generates a too low degree of autocorrelation and too early turnings points of inflation and is outperformed by a simple Hybrid Phillips curve. Chapter 4 starts from the critique of Driscoll and Holden (2003) on the relative real-wage model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995). While taking the critique seriously that Fuhrer and Moore’s model will collapse to a much simpler one without intrinsic inflation persistence if one takes their arguments literally, I extend the model by a term for inequality aversion. This model extension is not only in line with experimental evidence but results in a Hybrid Phillips curve with inflation persistence that is observably equivalent to that presented by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). In chapter 5, I present a model that especially allows to study the relationship between fairness attitudes and time preference (impatience). In the model, two individuals take decisions in two subsequent periods. In period 1, both individuals are endowed with resources and are able to donate a share of their resources to the other individual. In period 2, the two individuals might join in a common production after having bargained on the split of its output. The size of the production output depends on the relative share of resources at the end of period 1 as the human capital of the individuals, which is built by means of their resources, cannot fully be substituted one against each other. Therefore, it might be rational for a well-endowed individual in period 1 to act in a seemingly ‘fair’ manner and to donate own resources to its poorer counterpart. This decision also depends on the individuals’ impatience which is induced by the small but positive probability that production is not possible in period 2. As a general result, the individuals in the model economy are more likely to behave in a ‘fair’ manner, i.e., to donate resources to the other individual, the lower their own impatience and the higher the productivity of the other individual. As the (seemingly) ‘fair’ behavior is modelled as an endogenous outcome and as it is related to the aspect of time preference, the presented framework might help to further integrate behavioral economics and macroeconomics.