The empirical study of the price mechanism in the Chinese housing market

In China, the history of the establishment of the private housing market is pretty short. Actually in less then two decades, the market has grown from almost the scratch to playing an important role in the economy. A great achievement! But many problems also exist. They need to be properly addressed and solved. Price problem---simply put, housing price is too high--- is one of them, and this paper is focused on it. Three basic questions are posed, i.e. (1) how to judge the housing affordability? (2) why the housing price is so high? (3) how to solve the housing price problem. The paper pays particular attention to answering the second question. Except the numerous news reports and surveys show that most of the ordinary city dwellers complained about the high housing price, the mathematical means, the four ratios, are applied to judge the housing affordability in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The results are very clear that the price problem is severe. So why? Something is wrong with the price mechanism. This research shows that mainly these five factors contribute to the price problem: the housing reform, the housing development model, the unbalanced housing market, the housing project financing and the poor governmental management. Finally the paper puts forward five suggestions to solve the housing price problem in first-hand private Chinese housing market. They include: the establishment of real estate information system, the creation of specific price management department, the government price regulation, the property tax and the legalization of "cushion money".

Social Inequality and Social Policy outside the OECD

Almost all Latin American countries are still marked by extreme forms of social inequality – and to an extent, this seems to be the case regardless of national differences in the economic development model or the strength of democracy and the welfare state. Recent research highlights the fact that the heterogeneous labour markets in the region are a key source of inequality. At the same time, there is a strengthening of ‘exclusive’ social policy, which is located at the fault lines of the labour market and is constantly (re-)producing market-mediated disparities. In the last three decades, this type of social policy has even enjoyed democratic legitimacy. These dynamics challenge many of the assumptions guiding social policy and democratic theory, which often attempt to account for the specificities of the region by highlighting the purported flaws of certain policies. We suggest taking a different perspective: social policy in Latin American should not be grasped as a deficient or flawed type of social policy, but as a very successful relation of political domination. ‘Relational social analysis’ locates social policy in the ‘tension zone’ constituted by the requirements of economic reproduction, demands for democratic legitimacy and the relative autonomy of the state. From this vantage point, we will make the relation of domination in question accessible for empirical research. It seems particularly useful for this purpose to examine the recent shifts in the Latin American labour markets, which have undergone numerous reforms. We will examine which mechanisms, institutions and constellations of actors block or activate the potentials of redistribution inherent in such processes of political reform. This will enable us to explore the socio-political field of forces that has been perpetuating the social inequalities in Latin America for generations.

Core Labor Rights

The working paper’s main objective is to explore the extent to which non-compliance to international labor rights is caused by global competition. From the perspective of institutional economics, compliance with core labor rights is beneficial for sustainable development. Nonetheless, violations of these rights occur on a massive scale. The violators usually blame competitive pressures. A number of studies have come to the conclusion that non-compliance does not provide for a competitive edge, thereby denying any economic rationale for non-compliance. While we sympathize with this conclusion, we find that these studies suffer from faulty assumptions in the design of their regression analyses. The assumption of perfect markets devoid of power relations is particularly unrealistic. While workers' rights promise long-term benefits, they may incur short-term production cost increases. On the supply side, the production sites with the highest amount of labor rights violations are characterized by a near perfect competitive situation. The demand side, however, is dominated by an oligopoly of brand name companies and large retailers. Facing a large pool of suppliers, these companies enjoy more bargaining power. Developing countries, the hosts to most of these suppliers, are therefore limited in their ability to raise labor standards on their own. This competitive situation, however, is the very reason why labor rights have to be negotiated internationally. Our exploration starts with an outline of the institutionalist argument of the benefits of core labor rights. Second, we briefly examine some cross-country empirical studies on the impact of trade liberalization (as a proxy for competitive pressures). Third, we develop our own argument which differentiates the impact of trade liberalization along the axes of labor- and capital-intensive production as well as low and medium skill production. Finally, we present evidence from a study on the impact of trade liberalization in Indonesia on the garment industry as an example of a low skill, laborintensive industry on the one hand, and the automobile as an example for a medium skill, capital-intensive industry on the other hand. Because the garment industry’s workforce consists mainly of women, we also discuss the gender dimension of trade liberalization.

From evolution to co-evolution – An empirical study of the role of innovation, policy and public research in industrial dynamics

In the past decades since Schumpeter’s influential writings economists have pursued research to examine the role of innovation in certain industries on firm as well as on industry level. Researchers describe innovations as the main trigger of industry dynamics, while policy makers argue that research and education are directly linked to economic growth and welfare. Thus, research and education are an important objective of public policy. Firms and public research are regarded as the main actors which are relevant for the creation of new knowledge. This knowledge is finally brought to the market through innovations. What is more, policy makers support innovations. Both actors, i.e. policy makers and researchers, agree that innovation plays a central role but researchers still neglect the role that public policy plays in the field of industrial dynamics. Therefore, the main objective of this work is to learn more about the interdependencies of innovation, policy and public research in industrial dynamics. The overarching research question of this dissertation asks whether it is possible to analyze patterns of industry evolution – from evolution to co-evolution – based on empirical studies of the role of innovation, policy and public research in industrial dynamics. This work starts with a hypothesis-based investigation of traditional approaches of industrial dynamics. Namely, the testing of a basic assumption of the core models of industrial dynamics and the analysis of the evolutionary patterns – though with an industry which is driven by public policy as example. Subsequently it moves to a more explorative approach, investigating co-evolutionary processes. The underlying questions of the research include the following: Do large firms have an advantage because of their size which is attributable to cost spreading? Do firms that plan to grow have more innovations? What role does public policy play for the evolutionary patterns of an industry? Are the same evolutionary patterns observable as those described in the ILC theories? And is it possible to observe regional co-evolutionary processes of science, innovation and industry evolution? Based on two different empirical contexts – namely the laser and the photovoltaic industry – this dissertation tries to answer these questions and combines an evolutionary approach with a co-evolutionary approach. The first chapter starts with an introduction of the topic and the fields this dissertation is based on. The second chapter provides a new test of the Cohen and Klepper (1996) model of cost spreading, which explains the relationship between innovation, firm size and R&D, at the example of the photovoltaic industry in Germany. First, it is analyzed whether the cost spreading mechanism serves as an explanation for size advantages in this industry. This is related to the assumption that the incentives to invest in R&D increase with the ex-ante output. Furthermore, it is investigated whether firms that plan to grow will have more innovative activities. The results indicate that cost spreading serves as an explanation for size advantages in this industry and, furthermore, growth plans lead to higher amount of innovative activities. What is more, the role public policy plays for industry evolution is not finally analyzed in the field of industrial dynamics. In the case of Germany, the introduction of demand inducing policy instruments stimulated market and industry growth. While this policy immediately accelerated market volume, the effect on industry evolution is more ambiguous. Thus, chapter three analyzes this relationship by considering a model of industry evolution, where demand-inducing policies will be discussed as a possible trigger of development. The findings suggest that these instruments can take the same effect as a technical advance to foster the growth of an industry and its shakeout. The fourth chapter explores the regional co-evolution of firm population size, private-sector patenting and public research in the empirical context of German laser research and manufacturing over more than 40 years from the emergence of the industry to the mid-2000s. The qualitative as well as quantitative evidence is suggestive of a co-evolutionary process of mutual interdependence rather than a unidirectional effect of public research on private-sector activities. Chapter five concludes with a summary, the contribution of this work as well as the implications and an outlook of further possible research.