A Language for Interactive Cooperative Agents

Cooperative behaviour of agents within highly dynamic and nondeterministic domains is an active field of research. In particular establishing highly responsive teamwork, where agents are able to react on dynamic changes in the environment while facing unreliable communication and sensory noise, is an open problem. Moreover, modelling such responsive, cooperative behaviour is difficult. In this work, we specify a novel model for cooperative behaviour geared towards highly dynamic domains. In our approach, agents estimate each other’s decision and correct these estimations once they receive contradictory information. We aim at a comprehensive approach for agent teamwork featuring intuitive modelling capabilities for multi-agent activities, abstractions over activities and agents, and a clear operational semantic for the new model. This work encompasses a complete specification of the new language, ALICA.

More than irrigation - The Balinese Subak system as a unique form of cooperative water resource management in Indonesia

For over 1,000 years, the Balinese have developed a unique system of democratic and sustainable water irrigation. It has shaped the cultural landscapes of Bali and enables local communities to manage the ecology of terraced rice fields at the scale of whole watersheds. The Subak system has made the Balinese the most productive rice growers in Indonesia and ensures a high level of food sovereignty for a dense population on the volcanic island. The Subak system provides a vibrant example of a diverse, ecologically sustainable, economically productive and democratic water management system that is also characterized by its nonreliance on fossil fuel derivatives or heavy machinery. In 2012, UNESCO has recognized five rice terraces and their water temples as World Heritage site and supports its conservation and protection. However, the fragile Subak system is threatened for its complexity and interconnectedness by new agricultural practices and increasing tourism on the island.

Multi-Robot Task Allocation for Inspection Problems with Cooperative Tasks Using Hybrid Genetic Algorithms

In dieser Dissertation werden Methoden zur optimalen Aufgabenverteilung in Multirobotersystemen (engl. Multi-Robot Task Allocation – MRTA) zur Inspektion von Industrieanlagen untersucht. MRTA umfasst die Verteilung und Ablaufplanung von Aufgaben für eine Gruppe von Robotern unter Berücksichtigung von operativen Randbedingungen mit dem Ziel, die Gesamteinsatzkosten zu minimieren. Dank zunehmendem technischen Fortschritt und sinkenden Technologiekosten ist das Interesse an mobilen Robotern für den Industrieeinsatz in den letzten Jahren stark gestiegen. Viele Arbeiten konzentrieren sich auf Probleme der Mobilität wie Selbstlokalisierung und Kartierung, aber nur wenige Arbeiten untersuchen die optimale Aufgabenverteilung. Da sich mit einer guten Aufgabenverteilung eine effizientere Planung erreichen lässt (z. B. niedrigere Kosten, kürzere Ausführungszeit), ist das Ziel dieser Arbeit die Entwicklung von Lösungsmethoden für das aus Inspektionsaufgaben mit Einzel- und Zweiroboteraufgaben folgende Such-/Optimierungsproblem. Ein neuartiger hybrider Genetischer Algorithmus wird vorgestellt, der einen teilbevölkerungbasierten Genetischen Algorithmus zur globalen Optimierung mit lokalen Suchheuristiken kombiniert. Zur Beschleunigung dieses Algorithmus werden auf die fittesten Individuen einer Generation lokale Suchoperatoren angewendet. Der vorgestellte Algorithmus verteilt die Aufgaben nicht nur einfach und legt den Ablauf fest, sondern er bildet auch temporäre Roboterverbünde für Zweiroboteraufgaben, wodurch räumliche und zeitliche Randbedingungen entstehen. Vier alternative Kodierungsstrategien werden für den vorgestellten Algorithmus entworfen: Teilaufgabenbasierte Kodierung: Hierdurch werden alle möglichen Lösungen abgedeckt, allerdings ist der Suchraum sehr groß. Aufgabenbasierte Kodierung: Zwei Möglichkeiten zur Zuweisung von Zweiroboteraufgaben wurden implementiert, um die Effizienz des Algorithmus zu steigern. Gruppierungsbasierte Kodierung: Zeitliche Randbedingungen zur Gruppierung von Aufgaben werden vorgestellt, um gute Lösungen innerhalb einer kleinen Anzahl von Generationen zu erhalten. Zwei Umsetzungsvarianten werden vorgestellt. Dekompositionsbasierte Kodierung: Drei geometrische Zerlegungen wurden entworfen, die Informationen über die räumliche Anordnung ausnutzen, um Probleme zu lösen, die Inspektionsgebiete mit rechteckigen Geometrien aufweisen. In Simulationsstudien wird die Leistungsfähigkeit der verschiedenen hybriden Genetischen Algorithmen untersucht. Dazu wurde die Inspektion von Tanklagern einer Erdölraffinerie mit einer Gruppe homogener Inspektionsroboter als Anwendungsfall gewählt. Die Simulationen zeigen, dass Kodierungsstrategien, die auf der geometrischen Zerlegung basieren, bei einer kleinen Anzahl an Generationen eine bessere Lösung finden können als die anderen untersuchten Strategien. Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit Einzel- und Zweiroboteraufgaben, die entweder von einem einzelnen mobilen Roboter erledigt werden können oder die Zusammenarbeit von zwei Robotern erfordern. Eine Erweiterung des entwickelten Algorithmus zur Behandlung von Aufgaben, die mehr als zwei Roboter erfordern, ist möglich, würde aber die Komplexität der Optimierungsaufgabe deutlich vergrößern.

Reforming Cooperative Credit Structure in India for Financial Inclusion

In the drive for financial inclusion in India, cooperative banks assume prime importance as they are much more accessible to the rural poor than commercial banks. While more accessible, cooperative banks' financial health is rather poor and, therefore, might not be able to serve the needy in a sustained manner. A committee led by Prof. Vaidyanathan has outlined a revival package for cooperatives. Besides suggesting an infusion of funds, it called for the adherence to certain stringent norms to ensure the financial viability. The recommendations provided in the committee’s report are under various stages of implementation in India. The book examines the progress of this reform drive in Bihar, a state in Eastern India. It discusses the background for appointing the committee and its recommendations and also presents the findings of a field study conducted in this regard. The findings inform further policy suggestions which are of general interest to the drive for financial inclusion also in other countries.

Institutions, Behavior and Evolution

The three articles constituting this thesis are for reasons of content or method related to the following three fields in economics: Behavioral Economics, Evolutionary Game Theory and Formal Institutional Economics. A core element of these fields is the concept of individual preferences. Preferences are of central importance for the conceptional framework to analyze human behavior. They form the foundation for the theory of rational choice which is defined by the determination of the choice set and the selection of the most preferred alternative according to some consistency requirements. The theory of rational choice is based on a very simplified description of the problem of choice (object function and constraints). However, that choices depend on many more factors is for instance propagated by psychological theories and is supported by many empirical and experimental studies. This thesis adds to a better understanding of individual behavior to the extent that the evolution of certain characteristics of preferences and their consequences on human behavior forms the overarching theme of the dissertation. The long-term effect of evolutionary forces on a particular characteristic of importance in the theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature, the concept of inequality aversion, is subject of the article “The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life” (Chapter 4). The contribution of the article is the overcoming of a restriction of former approaches to analyze the evolution of preferences in very simple environments. By classifying human interaction into three central economic games, the article provides a first step towards a simplified and sufficiently complete description of the interaction environment. Within such an environment the article characterizes the evolutionary stable preference distribution. One result shows, that the interaction of the aforementioned three classes can stabilize a preference of inequality aversion in the subpopulation which is favored in the problem of redistribution. The two remaining articles are concerned with social norms, which dissemination is determined by medium-run forces of cultural evolution. The article “The impact of market innovations on the evolution of social norms: the sustainability case.“ (Chapter 2) studies the interrelation between product innovations which are relevant from a sustainability perspective and an according social norm in consumption. This relation is based on a conformity bias in consumption and the attempt to avoid cognitive dissonances resulting from non-compliant consumption. Among others, it is shown that a conformity bias on the consumption side can lead to multiple equilibria on the side of norm adoption. The article “Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas: signaling internalized norms.” (Chapter 3) studies the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas based on the signaling of social norms. The article provides a potential explanation of cooperative behavior, which does not rely on the assumption of structured populations or on the unmotivated ability of social norms to restrict individual actions or strategy spaces. A comprehensive result of the single articles is the explanation of the phenomenon of partial norm adaption or dissemination of preferences. The plurality of the applied approaches with respect to the proximity to the rational choice approach and regarding the underlying evolutionary mechanics is a particular strength of the thesis. It shows the equality of these approaches in their potential to explain the phenomenon of cooperation in environments that provide material incentives for defective behavior. This also points to the need of a unified framework considering the biological and cultural coevolution of preference patterns.