Some New Classes of Orthogonal Polynomials and Special Functions

In dieser Dissertation präsentieren wir zunächst eine Verallgemeinerung der üblichen Sturm-Liouville-Probleme mit symmetrischen Lösungen und erklären eine umfassendere Klasse. Dann führen wir einige neue Klassen orthogonaler Polynome und spezieller Funktionen ein, welche sich aus dieser symmetrischen Verallgemeinerung ableiten lassen. Als eine spezielle Konsequenz dieser Verallgemeinerung führen wir ein Polynomsystem mit vier freien Parametern ein und zeigen, dass in diesem System fast alle klassischen symmetrischen orthogonalen Polynome wie die Legendrepolynome, die Chebyshevpolynome erster und zweiter Art, die Gegenbauerpolynome, die verallgemeinerten Gegenbauerpolynome, die Hermitepolynome, die verallgemeinerten Hermitepolynome und zwei weitere neue endliche Systeme orthogonaler Polynome enthalten sind. All diese Polynome können direkt durch das neu eingeführte System ausgedrückt werden. Ferner bestimmen wir alle Standardeigenschaften des neuen Systems, insbesondere eine explizite Darstellung, eine Differentialgleichung zweiter Ordnung, eine generische Orthogonalitätsbeziehung sowie eine generische Dreitermrekursion. Außerdem benutzen wir diese Erweiterung, um die assoziierten Legendrefunktionen, welche viele Anwendungen in Physik und Ingenieurwissenschaften haben, zu verallgemeinern, und wir zeigen, dass diese Verallgemeinerung Orthogonalitätseigenschaft und -intervall erhält. In einem weiteren Kapitel der Dissertation studieren wir detailliert die Standardeigenschaften endlicher orthogonaler Polynomsysteme, welche sich aus der üblichen Sturm-Liouville-Theorie ergeben und wir zeigen, dass sie orthogonal bezüglich der Fisherschen F-Verteilung, der inversen Gammaverteilung und der verallgemeinerten t-Verteilung sind. Im nächsten Abschnitt der Dissertation betrachten wir eine vierparametrige Verallgemeinerung der Studentschen t-Verteilung. Wir zeigen, dass diese Verteilung gegen die Normalverteilung konvergiert, wenn die Anzahl der Stichprobe gegen Unendlich strebt. Eine ähnliche Verallgemeinerung der Fisherschen F-Verteilung konvergiert gegen die chi-Quadrat-Verteilung. Ferner führen wir im letzten Abschnitt der Dissertation einige neue Folgen spezieller Funktionen ein, welche Anwendungen bei der Lösung in Kugelkoordinaten der klassischen Potentialgleichung, der Wärmeleitungsgleichung und der Wellengleichung haben. Schließlich erklären wir zwei neue Klassen rationaler orthogonaler hypergeometrischer Funktionen, und wir zeigen unter Benutzung der Fouriertransformation und der Parsevalschen Gleichung, dass es sich um endliche Orthogonalsysteme mit Gewichtsfunktionen vom Gammatyp handelt.

Normative and cognitive influences on female entrepreneurial reluctance at the base of the pyramid - an explorative study of cleaning ladies in Istanbul

Previous research has considered entrepreneurship as a way out of poverty and as a chance to foster economic growth. Moreover, specifically start-ups headed by women have played an important role in the economic development and it has been argued that gender-related issues, amongst others, play a significant role for the performance of a country or region. Against this background, this qualitative study explores desires, reluctances and constraints toward entrepreneurial activities of a comparably homogenous group of potential (poor) entrepreneurs in an emerging economy—cleaning ladies in Istanbul. We focus on this particular context as still rather little is known on reasons why women do not start a business (in Turkey). We believe exploring the reasons why certain individuals choose not to become entrepreneurs is at least as telling as investigating why they do so. We draw upon the social dimensions of entrepreneurship by Shapero and Sokol (1982) alongside Institutional Theory and posit that normative and cognitive forces may shape individual decisions on entrepreneurship. We identified two basic clusters of women and discuss possible hindrance factors undermining entrepreneurial desires and limitations for entrepreneurship as well as possible avenues for policy makers (and MNCs) to foster entrepreneurship in the given community.

Institutions, Behavior and Evolution

The three articles constituting this thesis are for reasons of content or method related to the following three fields in economics: Behavioral Economics, Evolutionary Game Theory and Formal Institutional Economics. A core element of these fields is the concept of individual preferences. Preferences are of central importance for the conceptional framework to analyze human behavior. They form the foundation for the theory of rational choice which is defined by the determination of the choice set and the selection of the most preferred alternative according to some consistency requirements. The theory of rational choice is based on a very simplified description of the problem of choice (object function and constraints). However, that choices depend on many more factors is for instance propagated by psychological theories and is supported by many empirical and experimental studies. This thesis adds to a better understanding of individual behavior to the extent that the evolution of certain characteristics of preferences and their consequences on human behavior forms the overarching theme of the dissertation. The long-term effect of evolutionary forces on a particular characteristic of importance in the theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature, the concept of inequality aversion, is subject of the article “The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life” (Chapter 4). The contribution of the article is the overcoming of a restriction of former approaches to analyze the evolution of preferences in very simple environments. By classifying human interaction into three central economic games, the article provides a first step towards a simplified and sufficiently complete description of the interaction environment. Within such an environment the article characterizes the evolutionary stable preference distribution. One result shows, that the interaction of the aforementioned three classes can stabilize a preference of inequality aversion in the subpopulation which is favored in the problem of redistribution. The two remaining articles are concerned with social norms, which dissemination is determined by medium-run forces of cultural evolution. The article “The impact of market innovations on the evolution of social norms: the sustainability case.“ (Chapter 2) studies the interrelation between product innovations which are relevant from a sustainability perspective and an according social norm in consumption. This relation is based on a conformity bias in consumption and the attempt to avoid cognitive dissonances resulting from non-compliant consumption. Among others, it is shown that a conformity bias on the consumption side can lead to multiple equilibria on the side of norm adoption. The article “Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas: signaling internalized norms.” (Chapter 3) studies the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas based on the signaling of social norms. The article provides a potential explanation of cooperative behavior, which does not rely on the assumption of structured populations or on the unmotivated ability of social norms to restrict individual actions or strategy spaces. A comprehensive result of the single articles is the explanation of the phenomenon of partial norm adaption or dissemination of preferences. The plurality of the applied approaches with respect to the proximity to the rational choice approach and regarding the underlying evolutionary mechanics is a particular strength of the thesis. It shows the equality of these approaches in their potential to explain the phenomenon of cooperation in environments that provide material incentives for defective behavior. This also points to the need of a unified framework considering the biological and cultural coevolution of preference patterns.