Modell zur Förderung des Wettbewerbs und der Transparenz auf dem Ratingmarkt unter Berücksichtigung der Besonderheiten der deutschen Bankenstruktur

This paper provides a model for the international market of credit ratings in order to promote transparency of rating methodologies and combat the oligopolistic market structure where Standard & Poor‘s, Moody‘s and Fitch Ratings collectively comprise approximately 85 percent of the market. For the German credit market this paper strongly advises the establishment of at least three centralistic credit rating agencies (CRAs), set up and run independently by the large bank institutions – „Großbanken“, „Sparkassen“ and „Genossenschaftsbanken“. By acting as CRAs, universal banks could not only decrease their costs but would also be able to increase competition and transparency. These new credit rating agencies would be subject to the Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) surveillance standards that go far beyond the Basel II standard approach with its external ratings by the dominating three US-american CRAs. Due to the fact that the new Basle Accord has already been implemented in Europe, this model could be applied all over Europe and possibly even worldwide, assuming the US were to adopt the new capital adequacy rules. This would lead to an increase in the number of CRAs and hence to more competition, as the barriers to entry in the rating industry would not apply to these new institutions because of their expertise in the credit market. The fact that the IRB-criteria already have to be disclosed by law would make the methodologies transparent and subject to approval by national regulators such as the „Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht“ (BaFin) in Germany. Hence the requirement to set up a new monitoring committee in Europe would become obsolete.

Social Inequality and Social Policy outside the OECD

Almost all Latin American countries are still marked by extreme forms of social inequality – and to an extent, this seems to be the case regardless of national differences in the economic development model or the strength of democracy and the welfare state. Recent research highlights the fact that the heterogeneous labour markets in the region are a key source of inequality. At the same time, there is a strengthening of ‘exclusive’ social policy, which is located at the fault lines of the labour market and is constantly (re-)producing market-mediated disparities. In the last three decades, this type of social policy has even enjoyed democratic legitimacy. These dynamics challenge many of the assumptions guiding social policy and democratic theory, which often attempt to account for the specificities of the region by highlighting the purported flaws of certain policies. We suggest taking a different perspective: social policy in Latin American should not be grasped as a deficient or flawed type of social policy, but as a very successful relation of political domination. ‘Relational social analysis’ locates social policy in the ‘tension zone’ constituted by the requirements of economic reproduction, demands for democratic legitimacy and the relative autonomy of the state. From this vantage point, we will make the relation of domination in question accessible for empirical research. It seems particularly useful for this purpose to examine the recent shifts in the Latin American labour markets, which have undergone numerous reforms. We will examine which mechanisms, institutions and constellations of actors block or activate the potentials of redistribution inherent in such processes of political reform. This will enable us to explore the socio-political field of forces that has been perpetuating the social inequalities in Latin America for generations.