Modell zur Förderung des Wettbewerbs und der Transparenz auf dem Ratingmarkt unter Berücksichtigung der Besonderheiten der deutschen Bankenstruktur

This paper provides a model for the international market of credit ratings in order to promote transparency of rating methodologies and combat the oligopolistic market structure where Standard & Poor‘s, Moody‘s and Fitch Ratings collectively comprise approximately 85 percent of the market. For the German credit market this paper strongly advises the establishment of at least three centralistic credit rating agencies (CRAs), set up and run independently by the large bank institutions – „Großbanken“, „Sparkassen“ and „Genossenschaftsbanken“. By acting as CRAs, universal banks could not only decrease their costs but would also be able to increase competition and transparency. These new credit rating agencies would be subject to the Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) surveillance standards that go far beyond the Basel II standard approach with its external ratings by the dominating three US-american CRAs. Due to the fact that the new Basle Accord has already been implemented in Europe, this model could be applied all over Europe and possibly even worldwide, assuming the US were to adopt the new capital adequacy rules. This would lead to an increase in the number of CRAs and hence to more competition, as the barriers to entry in the rating industry would not apply to these new institutions because of their expertise in the credit market. The fact that the IRB-criteria already have to be disclosed by law would make the methodologies transparent and subject to approval by national regulators such as the „Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht“ (BaFin) in Germany. Hence the requirement to set up a new monitoring committee in Europe would become obsolete.

Transaction costs of farmers’ participation in forest management: Policy implications of payments for environmental services schemes in Vietnam

Recent research on payments for environmental services (PES) has observed that high transaction costs (TCs) are incurred through the implementation of PES schemes and farmer participation. TCs incurred by households are considered to be an obstacle to the participation in and efficiency of PES policies. This study aims to understand transactions related to previous forest plantation programmes and to estimate the actual TCs incurred by farmers who participated in these programmes in a mountainous area of northwestern Vietnam. In addition, this study examines determinants of households’ TCs to test the hypothesis of whether the amount of TCs varies according to household characteristics. Results show that average TCs are not likely to be a constraint for participation since they are about 200,000 VND (USD 10) per household per contract, which is equivalent to one person’s average earnings for about two days of labour. However, TCs amount to more than one-third of the programmes’ benefits, which is relatively high compared to PES programmes in developed countries. This implies that rather than aiming to reduce TCs, an appropriate agenda for policy improvement is to balance the level of TCs with PES programme benefits to enhance the overall attractiveness of afforestation programmes for smallholder farmers. Regression analysis reveals that education, gender and perception towards PES programmes have significant effects on the magnitude of TCs. The analyses also points out the importance of local conditions on the level of TCs, with some unexpected results.