Core Labor Rights

The working paper’s main objective is to explore the extent to which non-compliance to international labor rights is caused by global competition. From the perspective of institutional economics, compliance with core labor rights is beneficial for sustainable development. Nonetheless, violations of these rights occur on a massive scale. The violators usually blame competitive pressures. A number of studies have come to the conclusion that non-compliance does not provide for a competitive edge, thereby denying any economic rationale for non-compliance. While we sympathize with this conclusion, we find that these studies suffer from faulty assumptions in the design of their regression analyses. The assumption of perfect markets devoid of power relations is particularly unrealistic. While workers' rights promise long-term benefits, they may incur short-term production cost increases. On the supply side, the production sites with the highest amount of labor rights violations are characterized by a near perfect competitive situation. The demand side, however, is dominated by an oligopoly of brand name companies and large retailers. Facing a large pool of suppliers, these companies enjoy more bargaining power. Developing countries, the hosts to most of these suppliers, are therefore limited in their ability to raise labor standards on their own. This competitive situation, however, is the very reason why labor rights have to be negotiated internationally. Our exploration starts with an outline of the institutionalist argument of the benefits of core labor rights. Second, we briefly examine some cross-country empirical studies on the impact of trade liberalization (as a proxy for competitive pressures). Third, we develop our own argument which differentiates the impact of trade liberalization along the axes of labor- and capital-intensive production as well as low and medium skill production. Finally, we present evidence from a study on the impact of trade liberalization in Indonesia on the garment industry as an example of a low skill, laborintensive industry on the one hand, and the automobile as an example for a medium skill, capital-intensive industry on the other hand. Because the garment industry’s workforce consists mainly of women, we also discuss the gender dimension of trade liberalization.

Transkulturelle Bildung und Internationalisierung von Hochschulen

Internationalisierungsstrategien und -massnahmen an (deutschen) Hochschulen sind zumeist noch vom traditionellen herderschen Verständnis homogener Kulturen und damit von (kultureller) Abgrenzung, eigener Dominanz sowie den Defiziten der “Anderen“ geprägt. Die vielfältigen kulturellen, sprachlichen und fachlichen Ressourcen können dadurch bisher kaum bis gar nicht für innovative Lern- und Arbeitsprozesse fruchtbar gemacht werden. Transkulturelle Bildung bietet hingegen Chancen für Innovationen gerade zur Internationalisierung der Hochschulen. Der Beitrag formuliert dazu konzeptionelle Eckpunkte Transkultureller Bildung auf dem Weg zur dialogischen Öffnung von Hochschulen.

From evolution to co-evolution – An empirical study of the role of innovation, policy and public research in industrial dynamics

In the past decades since Schumpeter’s influential writings economists have pursued research to examine the role of innovation in certain industries on firm as well as on industry level. Researchers describe innovations as the main trigger of industry dynamics, while policy makers argue that research and education are directly linked to economic growth and welfare. Thus, research and education are an important objective of public policy. Firms and public research are regarded as the main actors which are relevant for the creation of new knowledge. This knowledge is finally brought to the market through innovations. What is more, policy makers support innovations. Both actors, i.e. policy makers and researchers, agree that innovation plays a central role but researchers still neglect the role that public policy plays in the field of industrial dynamics. Therefore, the main objective of this work is to learn more about the interdependencies of innovation, policy and public research in industrial dynamics. The overarching research question of this dissertation asks whether it is possible to analyze patterns of industry evolution – from evolution to co-evolution – based on empirical studies of the role of innovation, policy and public research in industrial dynamics. This work starts with a hypothesis-based investigation of traditional approaches of industrial dynamics. Namely, the testing of a basic assumption of the core models of industrial dynamics and the analysis of the evolutionary patterns – though with an industry which is driven by public policy as example. Subsequently it moves to a more explorative approach, investigating co-evolutionary processes. The underlying questions of the research include the following: Do large firms have an advantage because of their size which is attributable to cost spreading? Do firms that plan to grow have more innovations? What role does public policy play for the evolutionary patterns of an industry? Are the same evolutionary patterns observable as those described in the ILC theories? And is it possible to observe regional co-evolutionary processes of science, innovation and industry evolution? Based on two different empirical contexts – namely the laser and the photovoltaic industry – this dissertation tries to answer these questions and combines an evolutionary approach with a co-evolutionary approach. The first chapter starts with an introduction of the topic and the fields this dissertation is based on. The second chapter provides a new test of the Cohen and Klepper (1996) model of cost spreading, which explains the relationship between innovation, firm size and R&D, at the example of the photovoltaic industry in Germany. First, it is analyzed whether the cost spreading mechanism serves as an explanation for size advantages in this industry. This is related to the assumption that the incentives to invest in R&D increase with the ex-ante output. Furthermore, it is investigated whether firms that plan to grow will have more innovative activities. The results indicate that cost spreading serves as an explanation for size advantages in this industry and, furthermore, growth plans lead to higher amount of innovative activities. What is more, the role public policy plays for industry evolution is not finally analyzed in the field of industrial dynamics. In the case of Germany, the introduction of demand inducing policy instruments stimulated market and industry growth. While this policy immediately accelerated market volume, the effect on industry evolution is more ambiguous. Thus, chapter three analyzes this relationship by considering a model of industry evolution, where demand-inducing policies will be discussed as a possible trigger of development. The findings suggest that these instruments can take the same effect as a technical advance to foster the growth of an industry and its shakeout. The fourth chapter explores the regional co-evolution of firm population size, private-sector patenting and public research in the empirical context of German laser research and manufacturing over more than 40 years from the emergence of the industry to the mid-2000s. The qualitative as well as quantitative evidence is suggestive of a co-evolutionary process of mutual interdependence rather than a unidirectional effect of public research on private-sector activities. Chapter five concludes with a summary, the contribution of this work as well as the implications and an outlook of further possible research.

Der Einfluss von Lobbygruppen über den Einsatz von Schulmaterialien im Politikunterricht

Lobbyisten versuchen vermehrt Einfluss auf Schulen auszuüben. So berichtete das ZDF in seinem Magazin „frontal21“ darüber, wie Wirtschaftslobbyisten sich an Schulen engagieren. Diese versuchen Inhalte zu setzen und damit den Unterricht nachhaltig zu beeinflussen. So fordert beispielsweise das wirtschaftsnahe Institut für Ökonomische Bildung (IÖB) ein eigenständiges Unterrichtsfach „Wirtschaft“, um die vermeintlichen „[Wissens]lücke der Allgemeinbildung“ der Schülerinnen und Schüler (SuS) zu schließen (vgl. IÖB o.J., S. 16). Kritiker befürchten hingegen, dass ein Unterrichtsfach „Wirtschaft“ ein Fach sein wird, in dem ökonomische Themengebiete einseitig behandelt werden (vgl. Hedtke 2011, S. 14). Dies ist nur ein Beispiel, wie eine Lobbygruppe versucht, die eigenen Interessen im Bildungssektor mit Hilfe der Politik durchzusetzen. Lobbyismus in der Schule besitzt aber noch weitere Instrumente um Einfluss auszuüben. Diese Arbeit setzt sich mit kostenlos zur Verfügung gestellten Unterrichtsmaterialien Dritter, als ein mögliches Instrument der Einflussnahme, auseinander. Es wird untersucht, inwiefern angebotene Materialien einen manipulativen Charakter besitzen und wie transparent die Herausgeber auftreten. Dabei werden exemplarisch von drei unterschiedlichen Anbietern Unterrichtsmaterialien recherchiert, analysiert und anhand eines zuvor erstellten Beurteilungsleitfadens bewertet. Dies geschieht unter der Berücksichtigung des eigenen Anspruchs der Anbieter. Der thematische Schwerpunkt wird auf das Thema Mindestlohn gelegt, da diese Thematik sehr aktuell ist und immer wieder zu kontroversen Debatten in der Öffentlichkeit führt. Um eine Vielfallt an Positionen darzustellen, wird zur Analyse jeweils ein Anbieter aus dem arbeitnehmernahen, arbeitgebernahen und öffentlichen Lager ausgewählt. Das Themengebiet ist eines der wenigen, bei dem es zu einer Materialangebotsüberschneidung von allen drei Anbietern kommt.