2 resultados para 2003 Political Reform
em Boston College Law School, Boston College (BC), United States
Resumo:
In this paper I compare the habeas corpus systems of El Salvador, the United States and Argentina. My purpose is to develop a general understanding of the procedure for bringing the writ in each country and analyze the substantive law governing the rights of habeas corpus petitioners in each country. I evaluate the systems against the backdrop of each country’s political and legal history with respect to the writ of habeas corpus. The ultimate aim of this paper is to reform the habeas corpus law of El Salvador by analyzing the Salvadoran system as compared to the Argentine and U.S. systems. I conclude that the Argentine habeas corpus system provides a better model for the Salvadoran system than does the U.S. system. I draw this conclusion because the two countries share common foundations for their legal systems, in addition to common histories of civil war, during which there were numerous disappearances and denial of habeas corpus rights. Moreover, Argentina’s habeas corpus law protects the liberty interest of the detained individual more so than U.S. habeas corpus law. This heightened protection of the right to liberty largely results from the country’s past history of forced disappearances and incommunicado detention. Because El Salvador witnessed similar problems in its past, the Argentine model provides a good model for Salvadoran reform.
Resumo:
A comparative assessment of the successes and failures of the judicial reform efforts of El Salvador and Brazil in the 1980’s produces striking results. The reforms varied greatly in scope and were conducted in very different socio-political and economic backgrounds. While El Salvador’s reforms seemed narrow and ill-planned, on paper it appeared that Brazil’s broad reforms would be a successful model for any country with a fledgling democracy. Brazil’s reforms were an exercise in constitutionalism, implementing genuine separation of powers and receiving legislative and executive support. I was very surprised that these different approaches produced strikingly similar negative effects on the people’s assessment of the judiciary. From this outcome I concluded that while judicial reform of a corrupt or inefficient judiciary is an important step in ensuring the rule of law in society, it can not be the vehicle through which democratic reform is implemented. Quite to the contrary, for successful judicial reform to take place there must be considerable penetration of the law in society through enforcement of unbiased legislation, consistency in the laws and their enforcement, and sufficient time for the reform to have an effect on society.