Web2.0, knowledge sharing and privacy in E-learning

Quand le E-learning a émergé il ya 20 ans, cela consistait simplement en un texte affiché sur un écran d'ordinateur, comme un livre. Avec les changements et les progrès dans la technologie, le E-learning a parcouru un long chemin, maintenant offrant un matériel éducatif personnalisé, interactif et riche en contenu. Aujourd'hui, le E-learning se transforme de nouveau. En effet, avec la prolifération des systèmes d'apprentissage électronique et des outils d'édition de contenu éducatif, ainsi que les normes établies, c’est devenu plus facile de partager et de réutiliser le contenu d'apprentissage. En outre, avec le passage à des méthodes d'enseignement centrées sur l'apprenant, en plus de l'effet des techniques et technologies Web2.0, les apprenants ne sont plus seulement les récipiendaires du contenu d'apprentissage, mais peuvent jouer un rôle plus actif dans l'enrichissement de ce contenu. Par ailleurs, avec la quantité d'informations que les systèmes E-learning peuvent accumuler sur les apprenants, et l'impact que cela peut avoir sur leur vie privée, des préoccupations sont soulevées afin de protéger la vie privée des apprenants. Au meilleur de nos connaissances, il n'existe pas de solutions existantes qui prennent en charge les différents problèmes soulevés par ces changements. Dans ce travail, nous abordons ces questions en présentant Cadmus, SHAREK, et le E-learning préservant la vie privée. Plus précisément, Cadmus est une plateforme web, conforme au standard IMS QTI, offrant un cadre et des outils adéquats pour permettre à des tuteurs de créer et partager des questions de tests et des examens. Plus précisément, Cadmus fournit des modules telles que EQRS (Exam Question Recommender System) pour aider les tuteurs à localiser des questions appropriées pour leur examens, ICE (Identification of Conflits in Exams) pour aider à résoudre les conflits entre les questions contenu dans un même examen, et le Topic Tree, conçu pour aider les tuteurs à mieux organiser leurs questions d'examen et à assurer facilement la couverture des différent sujets contenus dans les examens. D'autre part, SHAREK (Sharing REsources and Knowledge) fournit un cadre pour pouvoir profiter du meilleur des deux mondes : la solidité des systèmes E-learning et la flexibilité de PLE (Personal Learning Environment) tout en permettant aux apprenants d'enrichir le contenu d'apprentissage, et les aider à localiser nouvelles ressources d'apprentissage. Plus précisément, SHAREK combine un système recommandation multicritères, ainsi que des techniques et des technologies Web2.0, tels que le RSS et le web social, pour promouvoir de nouvelles ressources d'apprentissage et aider les apprenants à localiser du contenu adapté. Finalement, afin de répondre aux divers besoins de la vie privée dans le E-learning, nous proposons un cadre avec quatre niveaux de vie privée, ainsi que quatre niveaux de traçabilité. De plus, nous présentons ACES (Anonymous Credentials for E-learning Systems), un ensemble de protocoles, basés sur des techniques cryptographiques bien établies, afin d'aider les apprenants à atteindre leur niveau de vie privée désiré.

Algorithmique et complexité des systèmes à compteurs

Réalisé en cotutelle avec l'École normale supérieure de Cachan – Université Paris-Saclay

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Patents, the Healthcare System and Benefit-Sharing

Lorraine Sheremeta, Research Associate, Health Law Institute, University of Alberta

Ordinal Cost Sharing.

We ask how the three known mechanisms for solving cost sharing problems with homogeneous cost functions - the value, the proportional, and the serial mechanisms - should be extended to arbitrary problem. We propose the Ordinality axiom, which requires that cost shares be invariante under all transactions preserving the nature of a cost sharing problem.