Testing Mean-Variance Efficiency in CAPM with Possibly Non-Gaussian Errors : An Exact Simulation-Based Approach

In this paper we propose exact likelihood-based mean-variance efficiency tests of the market portfolio in the context of Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), allowing for a wide class of error distributions which include normality as a special case. These tests are developed in the frame-work of multivariate linear regressions (MLR). It is well known however that despite their simple statistical structure, standard asymptotically justified MLR-based tests are unreliable. In financial econometrics, exact tests have been proposed for a few specific hypotheses [Jobson and Korkie (Journal of Financial Economics, 1982), MacKinlay (Journal of Financial Economics, 1987), Gib-bons, Ross and Shanken (Econometrica, 1989), Zhou (Journal of Finance 1993)], most of which depend on normality. For the gaussian model, our tests correspond to Gibbons, Ross and Shanken’s mean-variance efficiency tests. In non-gaussian contexts, we reconsider mean-variance efficiency tests allowing for multivariate Student-t and gaussian mixture errors. Our framework allows to cast more evidence on whether the normality assumption is too restrictive when testing the CAPM. We also propose exact multivariate diagnostic checks (including tests for multivariate GARCH and mul-tivariate generalization of the well known variance ratio tests) and goodness of fit tests as well as a set estimate for the intervening nuisance parameters. Our results [over five-year subperiods] show the following: (i) multivariate normality is rejected in most subperiods, (ii) residual checks reveal no significant departures from the multivariate i.i.d. assumption, and (iii) mean-variance efficiency tests of the market portfolio is not rejected as frequently once it is allowed for the possibility of non-normal errors.

The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee

This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically ineffcient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank’s control is infrequently adjusted.

The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public Schools.

This paper develops a bargaining model of wage and employment determination for the public sector. the solution to the model generates structural wage and employment equations that are estimated using data from New York State teacher-school district collective bargaining agreements.