Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Tests of Joint Hypotheses for Time Series Regression with a Unit Root

This Paper Studies Tests of Joint Hypotheses in Time Series Regression with a Unit Root in Which Weakly Dependent and Heterogeneously Distributed Innovations Are Allowed. We Consider Two Types of Regression: One with a Constant and Lagged Dependent Variable, and the Other with a Trend Added. the Statistics Studied Are the Regression \"F-Test\" Originally Analysed by Dickey and Fuller (1981) in a Less General Framework. the Limiting Distributions Are Found Using Functinal Central Limit Theory. New Test Statistics Are Proposed Which Require Only Already Tabulated Critical Values But Which Are Valid in a Quite General Framework (Including Finite Order Arma Models Generated by Gaussian Errors). This Study Extends the Results on Single Coefficients Derived in Phillips (1986A) and Phillips and Perron (1986).

Bad news for satisfied tenants: On the social construction of social rented housing as dreadful enclosures

As long as the social rented sector - which comprised 6% of the housing stock - housed traditional families and the allocation procedures were rather loose, little commotion came about. A combination of changes in family structures (leading to the in stream of ethnic minorities), economic changes (leading to the in stream of poor people), and the strengthening of allocation procedures towards those most in need, did change perceptions. Marginalisation and ghettoisation became during the 1990s the buzzwords when talking and writing about social rented housing. In this article, we will explain the background of the scapegoat trends and the possible consequences for social tenants in particular and for the social rental housing in general.

Factors that impact the sustainability of wait time management strategies for total joint replacement surgeries in canadian provinces

Pour répondre aux exigences du gouvernement fédéral quant aux temps d’attente pour les chirurgies de remplacement du genou et de la hanche, les établissements canadiens ont adopté des stratégies de gestion des listes d’attentes avec des niveaux de succès variables. Notre question de recherche visait à comprendre Quels facteurs ont permis de maintenir dans le temps un temps d’attente répondant aux exigences du gouvernement fédéral pendant au moins 6-12 mois? Nous avons développé un modèle possédant quatre facteurs, inspiré du modèle de Parsons (1977), afin d’analyser les facteurs comprenant la gouvernance, la culture, les ressources, et les outils. Trois études de cas ont été menées. En somme, le 1er cas a été capable d’obtenir les exigences pendant six mois mais incapable de les maintenir, le 2e cas a été capable de maintenir les exigences > 18 mois et le 3e cas a été incapable d’atteindre les objectifs. Des documents furent recueillis et des entrevues furent réalisées auprès des personnes impliquées dans la stratégie. Les résultats indiquent que l’hôpital qui a été en mesure de maintenir le temps d’attente possède certaines caractéristiques: réalisation exclusive de chirurgie de remplacement de la hanche et du genou, présence d’un personnel motivé, non distrait par d’autres préoccupations et un esprit d’équipe fort. Les deux autres cas ont eu à faire face à une culture médicale moins homogène et moins axés sur l’atteinte des cibles; des ressources dispersées et une politique intra-établissement imprécise. Le modèle d’hôpital factory est intéressant dans le cadre d’une chirurgie surspécialisée. Toutefois, les patients sont sélectionnés pour des chirurgies simples et dont le risque de complication est faible. Il ne peut donc pas être retenu comme le modèle durable par excellence.

Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach

This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the last 30-35 years (the U.K. Housing Act 1980 is a leading example). The main objective with this type of legislation is to transfer the ownership of the houses from the public authority to the tenants. To achieve this goal, selling prices of the public houses are typically heavily subsidized. The legislating body then faces a trade-off between achieving the goals of the legislation and allocating the houses efficiently. This paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable in a restricted preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public authority to the tenants. This rule is preferred to the current U.K. system by both the existing tenants and the public authority. Finally, a dynamic process for finding the outcome of the identified rule, in a finite number of steps, is provided.