Melanosomal targeting sequences from gp100 are essential for MHC class II-restricted endogenous epitope presentation and mobilization to endosomal compartments

CD4+ T lymphocytes play an important role in CD8+ T cell-mediated responses against tumors. Considering that about 20% of melanomas express major histocompatibility complex (MHC) class II, it is plausible that concomitant antigenic presentation by MHC class I and class II complexes shapes positive (helper T cells) or negative (regulatory T cells) anti-tumor responses. Interestingly, gp100, a melanoma antigen, can be presented by both MHC class I and class II when expressed endogenously, suggesting that it can reach endosomal/MHC class II compartments (MIIC). Here, we demonstrated that the gp100 putative amino-terminal signal sequence and the last 70 residues in carboxy-terminus, are essential for MIIC localization and MHC class II presentation. Confocal microscopy analyses confirmed that gp100 was localized in LAMP-1+ endosomal/MIIC. Gp100-targeting sequences were characterized by deleting different sections in the carboxy-terminus (residues 590 to 661). Transfection in 293T cells, expressing MHC class I and class II molecules, revealed that specific deletions in carboxy-terminus resulted in decreased MHC class II presentation, without effects on MHC class I presentation, suggesting a role in MIIC trafficking for these deleted sections. Then, we used these gp100-targeting sequences to mobilize the green fluorescent protein (GFP) to endosomal compartments, and to allow MHC class II and class I presentation of minimal endogenous epitopes. Thus, we concluded that these specific sequences are MIIC targeting motifs. Consequently, these sequences could be included in expression cassettes for endogenously expressed tumor or viral antigens to promote MHC class II and class I presentation and optimize in vivo T cell responses, or as an in vitro tool for characterization of new MHC class II epitopes.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.