La configuration spatiale et la hiérarchie urbaine en Colombie

Ce mémoire présente les résultats d'une recherche portant sur cinq villes colombiennes sélectionnées selon leur taille et le nombre d’emplois par secteur économique, d’après les données des recensements du Département Administratif National des Statistiques (DANE) qui s’étalent entre 1985 et 2005. La méthode d'analyse adoptée est de type descriptif et met l'accent sur des facteurs de taille et de nombre d’habitants afin d’évaluer la hiérarchie entre les villes entre 1985 et 2005, et de comprendre, pour la même période, la spécialisation des cinq villes à travers leurs données d’emplois respectives. Cette méthode est complétée par l’utilisation des outils d’évaluation régionale et urbaine pour comprendre le processus de polarisation en Colombie. L’économie colombienne est dominée par les villes de grande taille ou les régions métropolitaines qui constituent les plus grands marchés (économies d'agglomération). Cependant, ces zones (Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla et Bucaramanga) ne sont pas intégrées. Par conséquent, la prédominance de ces centres s’est considérablement réduite.

Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies.

We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.

Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods.

We consider the problem of provisioon and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. the efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its cost, where r is set as low as possible.

Dynamic linear economies with social interactions

Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important phenomena, from smoking and other risky behavior in teens to e.g., peer effects in school performance. We study social interactions in dynamic economies. For these economies, we provide existence (Markov Perfect Equilibrium in pure strategies), ergodicity, and welfare results. Also, we characterize equilibria in terms of agents' policy function, spatial equilibrium correlations and social multiplier effects, depending on the nature of interactions. Most importantly, we study formally the issue of the identification of social interactions, with special emphasis on the restrictions imposed by dynamic equilibrium conditions.

(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules which are minimally manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities

We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. This note provides an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.