The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements

This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollutant and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. Three distinct intervals for the length of the period of commitment are identified, across which the equilibrium and its dynamic behavior differ considerably. Whereas for sufficiently high values of the period of commitment only self-enforcing agreements of two countries are possible, for sufficiently low such values full cooperation can be generated. Lengths of periods of commitment between those two thresholds are characterized by an inverse relationship between the length of commitment and the membership size of the agreement. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements.

On the Effects of Mergers on Equilibrium Outcomes in a Common Property Renewable Asset Oligopoly

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the merger on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the merger for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset's stock such that any merger is profitable if the stock at the time the merger is formed falls within that interval. That includes mergers that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.

The Effects of Civic Education on Political Knowledge

Traditionally political knowledge was regarded as an important potential outcome for civic education efforts. Most of the currently available research, however, tends to focus on non-cognitive goals, despite the fact that studies repeatedly have shown that political knowledge is an important resource for enlightened and engaged citizenship. In this article, we investigate whether civic education contributes to political knowledge levels. The analysis is based on the Belgian Political Panel Survey, a two year panel study among 2,988 Belgian late adolescents. The analysis shows that experiences with group projects at school contribute significantly to political knowledge levels two years later on. Furthermore, we can observe an interaction effect as those who are already most knowledgeable about politics, gain most from these group projects. Classes about politics, on the other hand, did not have an effect on knowledge levels. In the discussion, it is argued that civic education can have strong cognitive effects, but that these effects are not always related to classical civic education efforts.