Decentralization and Economic Growth: a Case Study for Canada.

Rapport de recherche

Religion and Economic Growth: Was Weber Right?

Evidence of falling wages in Catholic cities and rising wages in Protestant cities between 1500 and 1750, during the spread of literacy in the vernacular, is inconsistent with most theoretical models of economic growth. In The Protestant Ethic, Weber suggested an alternative explanation based on culture. Here, a theoretical model confirms that a small change in the subjective cost of cooperating with strangers can generate a profound transformation in trading networks. In explaining urban growth in early-modern Europe, specifications compatible with human-capital versions of the neoclassical model and endogenous-growth theory are rejected in favor of a “small-world” formulation based on the Weber thesis.

Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.

Oil Wealth and Economic Behavior Iran 1960-2000.

Rapport de recherche

Communication and Economic Growth.

Overs the past millennium, each of the three centuries of most rapid demographic growth in the West Coincided with the diffusion of a new communications technology. This paper examines the hypothesis of Harold Innis (1894-1952) that there is two-way feeback between such innovations and economic growth.

The Discipline of Economics and Economic Cycles

In This Article, It Is Argued That the Long International, Financial and Economic Cycle (50-60 Years) Is More Than a Statistical Aberration, and Is the Result of Institutional Political, Financial and Economic Conditions Which Are Recurrent. It Is Proposed As an Hypothesis That the Breakdown of International Monetary Systems Is At the Origin of Hte Financial and Economic Long Cycle. Such a Breakdown Starts a Process of Unexpected Inflation, of Balance of Payments Imbalances and of International Indebtedness in a Key-Currency. the Last Stage of This Process Is Characterized by Disinflation, a Speculative Stock Market Boom and a Period of Debt-Liquidation Which Negatively Affect the Real Side of the Economy. Without an International and Automatic Mechanism to Correct the Financial and Economic International Imbalances, the World Economy Runs the Risk of Getting More and More Unstable Until the Turning Point. International Monetary Cooperation Could Contribute in Alleviating the Negative Spillovers Accompanying Hte Adjustment of These Imbalances.

Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development

Poor countries have lower PPP–adjusted investment rates and face higher relative prices of investment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either because these countries have a relatively lower TFP in industries producing capital goods, or because they are subject to greater investment distortions. This paper provides a micro–foundation for the cross–country dispersion in investment distortions. We first document that firms producing capital goods face a higher level of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors’ rights is incomplete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment in the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn, this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods, invest a lower fraction of their income, and end up being poorer. We find that our mechanism may be quantitatively important.

Patterns of discrepancy in perceptions of workgroup and organizational cultures and their relationships to well-being, commitment and organizational citizenship behavior

La culture organisationnelle influence la manière dont les organismes relèvent les défis externes auxquels elle fait face et façonnent les comportements normatifs de leurs membres. Des études portant sur le degré d’acceptation et d’adoption d’une culture organisationnelle indiquent une grande variance en fonction de multiples facteurs (p. ex. : l’âge, l’occupation, la hiérarchie, etc.) et leurs liens aux résultats subséquents. Différentes évaluations culturelles considèrent les sondages d’auto-évalulation comme étant des moyens acceptables de créer des liens entre les perceptions et les résultats. En effet, ces instruments mesurent les croyances, les suppositions et les valeurs d’une personne, mais l’un des facteurs pouvant compromettre les réponses est le manque de cadre de référence. Un des objectifs de l’étude est de déterminer la manière dont la mesure des perceptions culturelles est reliée à la contextualisation des questions du sondage. À l’aide de deux orientations, nous tentons de déterminer si les perceptions de la culture en lien avec l’organisation entière sont différentes de celles en lien avec le groupe de travail immédiat. De plus, l’étude explore la manière dont les différences algébriques entre les perceptions des deux référents sont simultanément reliées au bien-être psychologique au travail, à l’engagement et aux comportements de citoyenneté organisationnelle. Comme objectif final, nous déterminons lequel des deux référents prédit le mieux ces résultats. Les cent quatre-vingt-neuf participants de l’étude faisaient partie d’un établissement d’enseignement postsecondaire de langue anglaise du Québec. En premier lieu, les participants recevaient, de façon aléatoire, l’un des deux questionnaires - soit celui orienté sur l’organisation entière, soit celui orienté sur le groupe de travail immédiat -, puis, en deuxième lieu, son référent opposé correspondant. Les résultats indiquent que les perceptions de culture en lien avec l’organisation entière sont significativement différentes de celle en lien avec le groupe de travail immédiat. L’étude démontre que les similitudes entre les perceptions sont directement proportionnelles au bien-être ainsi qu’aux engagements organisationnels et de groupe de travail. De plus grandes différences perceptuelles sont associées à des niveaux plus élevés de bien-être et d’engagement organisationnel normatif. Ces associations sont plus fortes lorsque les perceptions de la culture organisationnelle sont plus positives que les perceptions de la culture du groupe de travail. Les différences algébriques opposées sont liées à des niveaux plus élevés de comportements de citoyenneté organisationnelle ainsi que d’engagements affectifs et de continuité envers le groupe de travail. Les résultats de l’étude suggèrent aussi que les perceptions de la culture du groupe de travail sont plus liées aux résultats pertinents que les perceptions de la culture organisationnelle. Les implications théoriques et pratiques des mesures de perceptions de culture sont examinées.

The economic voter and economic crisis

Theories of economic voting have a long tradition in political science and continue to inspire a large group of scholars. Classical economic voting theory assumes a reward-and-punishment mechanism (Key, 1966). This mechanism implies that incumbents are more likely to stay in power under a good economy, but are cast out under a bad economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). The economy has repeatedly been shown to be a major determinant of electoral behavior (see especially the recent book by Duch and Stevenson, 2008), but the current economic crisis seems to provide a marked illustration of how the economy affects voting. In recent elections across the Western industrialized world, most ruling coalitions lost their majority. Opposition parties, on the other hand, whether right wing or left wing, have appeared to benefit from the economic downturn.