Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

Unresolved states of mind with respect to attachment : developmental significance, subtypes, and relations to disrupted caregiving

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Finite-Sample Diagnostics for Multivariate Regressions with Applications to Linear Asset Pricing Models

In this paper, we propose several finite-sample specification tests for multivariate linear regressions (MLR) with applications to asset pricing models. We focus on departures from the assumption of i.i.d. errors assumption, at univariate and multivariate levels, with Gaussian and non-Gaussian (including Student t) errors. The univariate tests studied extend existing exact procedures by allowing for unspecified parameters in the error distributions (e.g., the degrees of freedom in the case of the Student t distribution). The multivariate tests are based on properly standardized multivariate residuals to ensure invariance to MLR coefficients and error covariances. We consider tests for serial correlation, tests for multivariate GARCH and sign-type tests against general dependencies and asymmetries. The procedures proposed provide exact versions of those applied in Shanken (1990) which consist in combining univariate specification tests. Specifically, we combine tests across equations using the MC test procedure to avoid Bonferroni-type bounds. Since non-Gaussian based tests are not pivotal, we apply the “maximized MC” (MMC) test method [Dufour (2002)], where the MC p-value for the tested hypothesis (which depends on nuisance parameters) is maximized (with respect to these nuisance parameters) to control the test’s significance level. The tests proposed are applied to an asset pricing model with observable risk-free rates, using monthly returns on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) portfolios over five-year subperiods from 1926-1995. Our empirical results reveal the following. Whereas univariate exact tests indicate significant serial correlation, asymmetries and GARCH in some equations, such effects are much less prevalent once error cross-equation covariances are accounted for. In addition, significant departures from the i.i.d. hypothesis are less evident once we allow for non-Gaussian errors.

Relative Uncertainty and Additively Representable Set Rankings

This paper proposes a definition of relative uncertainty aversion for decision models under complete uncertainty. It is shown that, for a large class of decision rules characterized by a set of plausible axioms, the new criterion yields a complete ranking of those rules with respect to the relative degree of uncertainty aversion they represent. In addition, we address a combinatorial question that arises in this context, and we examine conditions for the additive representability of our rules.

Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities

In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important market design problems, the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA-)mechanism with responsive strict priorities performs well and economists have successfully implemented DA-mechanisms or slight variants thereof. We show that almost all real-life mechanisms used in such environments - including the large classes of priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms - satisfy a set of simple and intuitive properties. Once we add strategy-proofness to these properties, DA-mechanisms are the only ones surviving. In market design problems that are based on weak priorities (like school choice), generally multiple tie-breaking (MTB)procedures are used and then a mechanism is implemented with the obtained strict priorities. By adding stability with respect to the weak priorities, we establish the first normative foundation for MTB-DA-mechanisms that are used in NYC.

Structural aspects of the ribosome evolution and function

Les résultats ont été obtenus avec le logiciel "Insight-2" de Accelris (San Diego, CA)