Implementing the Precautionary Principle through Stakeholder Engagement for Product and Service Development

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Guide des bonnes pratiques en matière de gouvernance et « Sustainability framework » : l’orientation de l’International Federation of Accountants vers un « capitalisme stakeholder »

Au premier trimestre 2009, le normalisateur mondial de la profession comptable (International Federation of Accountants) a publié deux documents destinés à apporter une aide aux professionnels de la comptabilité et de la finance sur leur prise en compte du développement durable et des parties prenantes d’une entreprise. En premier lieu, l’International Federation of Accountants propose un cadre d’analyse durable. Outil destiné aux comptables et financiers, il vise à faire de ces derniers un maillon essentiel du développement de nouvelles pratiques favorisant une performance économique, sociale et environnementale des entreprises. En second lieu, l’International Federation of Accountants vient de diffuser un guide international des bonnes pratiques en matière de gouvernance d’entreprise complétant les codes de gouvernance existant et ayant pour objectif d’inscrire les entreprises dans une approche stakeholder. A l’heure où la crise financière se fait ressentir et où la finance se trouve décriée pour s’être focalisée sur la valeur actionnariale, la position de l’International Federation of Accountants est révélatrice d’un changement de paradigme non sans conséquence pour la comptabilité, la finance et le droit.

Two approaches to stakeholder identification

The paper presents two fundamentally different ways to approach the identification of stakeholders. The first is the relationship approach. According to this approach, special obligations arise between individuals or groups only if a specific relationship exists between them. The rival approach is the assignment approach. This approach challenges the claim that obligations only arise if a particular relationship exists between the company and a group. It holds that the distribution of responsibilities should be viewed as a set of pragmatic rules derived from general moral considerations. The paper discusses the extent to which these two approaches can justify the main features of the traditional stakeholder model.

A Moral Stakeholder Theory of the Firm

To be a coherent and genuinely alternative conception to the shareholder model, any moral stakeholder theory must meet the following conditions: (1) It must be an ethical theory; (2) It must identify a limited group as stakeholders; (3) The group must be identified on morally relevant grounds; (4) Stakeholder claims must be non-universal; (5) And not held against everyone. A principle for identifying the stakeholder is suggested as a person who has much to lose – financially, socially, or psychologically – by the failure of the firm. The emerging picture contrasts sharply with the conventional conception of the firm.

What can the Stakeholder Theory Learn from Enron?

Roughly speaking, Enron has done for reflection on corporate governance what AIDS did for research on the immune system. So far, however, virtually all of this reflection on and subsequent reform of governance has come from those with a stake in the success of modern capitalism. This paper identifies a number of governance challenges for critics of capitalism, and in particular for those who urge corporations to voluntarily adopt missions of broader social responsibility and equal treatment for all stakeholder groups. I argue that by generally neglecting the governance relation between shareholders and senior managers, stakeholder theorists have underestimated the way in which shareholder-focused governance can be in the interests of all stakeholder groups. The enemy, if you will, is not capitalists (shareholders), but greedy, corrupt or incompetent managers. A second set of governance challenges for stakeholder theorists concerns their largely untested proposals for governance reforms that would require managers to act in the interests of all stakeholders and not just shareholders; in other words to treat shareholders as just another stakeholder group. I suggest that in such a governance regime it may be almost impossible to hold managers accountable to anyone – just as it was when state-owned enterprises were given “multi-stakeholder” mandates in the 1960s and 1970s.

Effects of emotional salience and semantic domain on cross-form priming

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.