Wage Policy of Firms: an Empirical Investigation.

This paper analyzes the dynamics of wages and workers' mobility within firms with a hierarchical structure of job levels. The theoretical model proposed by Gibbons and Waldman (1999), that combines the notions of human capital accumulation, job rank assignments based on comparative advantage and learning about workers' abilities, is implemented empirically to measure the importance of these elements in explaining the wage policy of firms. Survey data from the GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel) are used to draw conclusions on the common features characterizing the wage policy of firms from a large sample of firms. The GSOEP survey also provides information on the worker's rank within his firm which is usually not available in other surveys. The results are consistent with non-random selection of workers onto the rungs of a job ladder. There is no direct evidence of learning about workers' unobserved abilities but the analysis reveals that unmeasured ability is an important factor driving wage dynamics. Finally, job rank effects remain significant even after controlling for measured and unmeasured characteristics.

Some Implications of the Zero Lower Bound on Interest Rates for the Term Structure and Monetary Policy

In an economy where cash can be stored costlessly (in nominal terms), the nominal interest rate is bounded below by zero. This paper derives the implications of this nonnegativity constraint for the term structure and shows that it induces a nonlinear and convex relation between short- and long-term interest rates. As a result, the long-term rate responds asymmetrically to changes in the short-term rate, and by less than predicted by a benchmark linear model. In particular, a decrease in the short-term rate leads to a decrease in the long-term rate that is smaller in magnitude than the increase in the long-term rate associated with an increase in the short-term rate of the same size. Up to the extent that monetary policy acts by affecting long-term rates through the term structure, its power is considerably reduced at low interest rates. The empirical predictions of the model are examined using data from Japan.

Credibility and Signaling in Disinflation- a Cross Country Examination

This paper develops a model of money demand where the opportunity cost of holding money is subject to regime changes. The regimes are fully characterized by the mean and variance of inflation and are assumed to be the result of alternative government policies. Agents are unable to directly observe whether government actions are indeed consistent with the inflation rate targeted as part of a stabilization program but can construct probability inferences on the basis of available observations of inflation and money growth. Government announcements are assumed to provide agents with additional, possibly truthful information regarding the regime. This specification is estimated and tested using data from the Israeli and Argentine high inflation periods. Results indicate the successful stabilization program implemented in Israel in July 1985 was more credible than either the earlier Israeli attempt in November 1984 or the Argentine programs. Government’s signaling might substantially simplify the inference problem and increase the speed of learning on the part of the agents. However, under certain conditions, it might increase the volatility of inflation. After the introduction of an inflation stabilization plan, the welfare gains from a temporary increase in real balances might be high enough to induce agents to raise their real balances in the short-term, even if they are uncertain about the nature of government policy and the eventual outcome of the stabilization attempt. Statistically, the model restrictions cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level.

Inter-temporal Price Discrimination when Imports are Restricted by Quotas

A dominant firm holding import quota engages in inter-temporal price discrimination when facing a competitive fringe engaged in seasonal production. This causes a welfare loss that comes in addition the loss attributable to limitation of imports below the free trade level.

Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the U.S.

This paper derives optimal monetary policy rules in setups where certainty equivalence does not hold because either central bank preferences are not quadratic, and/or the aggregate supply relation is nonlinear. Analytical results show that these features lead to sign and size asymmetries, and nonlinearities in the policy rule. Reduced-form estimates indicate that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule after 1983, but not before 1979. This finding is consistent with the view that the Fed's inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan regime differ considerably from the ones during the Burns-Miller regime.

The Transmission of Monetary Policy in a Multi-Sector Economy

This paper constructs and estimates a sticky-price, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with heterogenous production sectors. Sectors differ in price stickiness, capital-adjustment costs and production technology, and use output from each other as material and investment inputs following an Input-Output Matrix and Capital Flow Table that represent the U.S. economy. By relaxing the standard assumption of symmetry, this model allows different sectoral dynamics in response to monetary policy shocks. The model is estimated by Simulated Method of Moments using sectoral and aggregate U.S. time series. Results indicate 1) substantial heterogeneity in price stickiness across sectors, with quantitatively larger differences between services and goods than previously found in micro studies that focus on final goods alone, 2) a strong sensitivity to monetary policy shocks on the part of construction and durable manufacturing, and 3) similar quantitative predictions at the aggregate level by the multi-sector model and a standard model that assumes symmetry across sectors.

The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee

This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically ineffcient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank’s control is infrequently adjusted.

How Prescribed Policy Can Mislead when Data Are Defective: a Follow-Up to Srinivasan (1994) Using General Equilibrium.

We highlight an example of considerable bias in officially published input-output data (factor-income shares) by an LDC (Turkey), which many researchers use without question. We make use of an intertemporal general equilibrium model of trade and production to evaluate the dynamic gains for Turkey from currently debated trade policy options and compare the predictions using conservatively adjusted, rather than official, data on factor shares.