Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle.

We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes only his most preferred public good without rivalry. We extend preferences lexicographically and characterize the class of single-peaked preference rules by Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination. This result is considerably different from the corresponding characterization by Miyagawa (2001a).

Implementing the Precautionary Principle through Stakeholder Engagement for Product and Service Development

Section des étudiants

Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle

We consider the problem of regulating an economy with environmental pollution. We examine the distributional impact of the polluter-pays principle which requires that any agent compensates all other agents for the damages caused by his or her (pollution) emissions. With constant marginal damages we show that regulation via the polluter-pays principle leads to the unique welfare distribution that assigns non-negative individual welfare and renders each agent responsible for his or her pollution impact. We extend both the polluter-pays principle and this result to increasing marginal damages due to pollution. We also discuss the acceptability of the polluter-pays principle and compare it with the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism.