Durable Goods, Inter-Sectoral Linkages and Monetary Policy

Barsky, House and Kimball (2007) show that introducing durable goods into a sticky-price model leads to negative sectoral comovement of production following a monetary policy shock and, under certain conditions, to aggregate neutrality. These results appear to undermine sticky-price models. In this paper, we show that these results are not robust to two prominent and realistic features of the data, namely input-output interactions and limited mobility of productive inputs. When extended to allow for both features, the sticky-price model with durable goods delivers implications in line with VAR evidence on the effects of monetary policy shocks.

Sectoral Price Rigidity and Aggregate Dynamics

In this paper, we study the macroeconomic implications of sectoral heterogeneity and, in particular, heterogeneity in price setting, through the lens of a highly disaggregated multi-sector model. The model incorporates several realistic features and is estimated using a mix of aggregate and sectoral U.S. data. The frequencies of price changes implied by our estimates are remarkably consistent with those reported in micro-based studies, especially for non-sale prices. The model is used to study (i) the contribution of sectoral characteristics to the observed cross sectional heterogeneity in sectoral output and inflation responses to a monetary policy shock, (ii) the implications of sectoral price rigidity for aggregate output and inflation dynamics and for cost pass-through, and (iii) the role of sectoral shocks in explaining sectoral prices and quantities.

L’extinction de l'extension juridique des conventions collectives dans le secteur manufacturier au Québec : le cas de l'industrie du vêtement

RÉSUMÉ Le gouvernement du Québec a adopté en novembre 1999 le projet de loi 47, relatif à la Loi concernant les conditions de travail dans certains secteurs de l’industrie du vêtement et modifiant la Loi sur les normes du travail (1999, c. 57). Son entrée en vigueur eut pour effet d’abroger au 30 juin 2000 les quatre (4) décrets sectoriels de convention collective qui régissaient les conditions d’emploi d’approximativement 23 000 travailleurs affectés à la production de vêtements (gant de cuir, chemise pour hommes et garçons, confection pour hommes et pour dames). Cette recherche démontre que bien qu’inscrit dans une logique étatique de dérégulation du travail visant à favoriser la compétitivité, le maintien de normes de substitution aux décrets dans le cas du vêtement québécois ne dérive pas pour autant d’une déréglementation strictement néolibérale. Au plan plus théorique, l’émergence et le sort du régime de conditions d’emploi étudié dévoilent la nature politique du processus d’élaboration des règles salariales, qu’il soit d’origine législative ou contractuelle. Cette dynamique repose sur le caractère mouvant des relations de pouvoir et d’influence des agents engagés dans la régulation institutionnelle, où l’État est appelé à jouer un rôle de catalyseur ─ et non de tiers arbitre indépendant ─ à l’endroit des tensions qui procèdent du rapport salarial et du mode de production au sein duquel il s’inscrit.

Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development

Poor countries have lower PPP–adjusted investment rates and face higher relative prices of investment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either because these countries have a relatively lower TFP in industries producing capital goods, or because they are subject to greater investment distortions. This paper provides a micro–foundation for the cross–country dispersion in investment distortions. We first document that firms producing capital goods face a higher level of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors’ rights is incomplete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment in the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn, this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods, invest a lower fraction of their income, and end up being poorer. We find that our mechanism may be quantitatively important.

Cross-sectoral variation in the volatility of plant-level idiosyncratic shocks

We estimate the volatility of plant–level idiosyncratic shocks in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Our measure of volatility is the variation in Revenue Total Factor Productivity which is not explained by either industry– or economy–wide factors, or by establishments’ characteristics. Consistent with previous studies, we find that idiosyncratic shocks are much larger than aggregate random disturbances, accounting for about 80% of the overall uncertainty faced by plants. The extent of cross–sectoral variation in the volatility of shocks is remarkable. Plants in the most volatile sector are subject to about six times as much idiosyncratic uncertainty as plants in the least volatile. We provide evidence suggesting that idiosyncratic risk is higher in industries where the extent of creative destruction is likely to be greater.