Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.

Genome-wide location analysis and expression studies reveal a role for p110 CUX1 in the activation of DNA replication genes.

Proteolytic processing of the CUX1 transcription factor generates an isoform, p110 that accelerates entry into S phase. To identify targets of p110 CUX1 that are involved in cell cycle progression, we performed genome-wide location analysis using a promoter microarray. Since there are no antibodies that specifically recognize p110, but not the full-length protein, we expressed physiological levels of a p110 isoform with two tags and purified chromatin by tandem affinity purification (ChAP). Conventional ChIP performed on synchronized populations of cells confirmed that p110 CUX1 is recruited to the promoter of cell cycle-related targets preferentially during S phase. Multiple approaches including silencing RNA (siRNA), transient infection with retroviral vectors, constitutive expression and reporter assays demonstrated that most cell cycle targets are activated whereas a few are repressed or not affected by p110 CUX1. Functional classes that were over-represented among targets included DNA replication initiation. Consistent with this finding, constitutive expression of p110 CUX1 led to a premature and more robust induction of replication genes during cell cycle progression, and stimulated the long-term replication of a plasmid bearing the oriP replicator of Epstein Barr virus (EBV).

Reproductive Tourism in Argentina: Clinic Accreditation and its Implications for Consumers, Health Professionals and Policy Makers

A subcategory of medical tourism, reproductive tourism has been the subject of much public and policy debate in recent years. Specific concerns include: the exploitation of individuals and communities, access to needed health care services, fair allocation of limited resources, and the quality and safety of services provided by private clinics. To date, the focus of attention has been on the thriving medical and reproductive tourism sectors in Asia and Eastern Europe; there has been much less consideration given to more recent ‘players’ in Latin America, notably fertility clinics in Chile, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. In this paper, we examine the context-specific ethical and policy implications of private Argentinean fertility clinics that market reproductive services via the internet. Whether or not one agrees that reproductive services should be made available as consumer goods, the fact is that they are provided as such by private clinics around the world. We argue that basic national regulatory mechanisms are required in countries such as Argentina that are marketing fertility services to local and international publics. Specifically, regular oversight of all fertility clinics is essential to ensure that consumer information is accurate and that marketed services are safe and effective. It is in the best interests of consumers, health professionals and policy makers that the reproductive tourism industry adopts safe and responsible medical practices.

(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules which are minimally manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

Canadian Bioethics Research and Scholarship: A Need for Explicit Leadership and Support by Research Funders

La tribune de l'éditeur / Editor's Soapbox

Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms

We show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, must be ordinal. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions.