Régime de taux de change et volatilité macroéconomique.

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Convergence, investissements directs étrangers et échanges commerciaux: le club de convergence pour les pays latino-américains.

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The role of investment specific technological shocks in explaining macroeconomics fluctuations.

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The Cyclicality of Skilled and Unskilled Employment in Canada.

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La zone monétaire unique d’Afrique de l’ouest est-elle optimale ?

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On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

The Backing of Government Debt and the Price Level

This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies, and their joint role in the determination of the price level. The government is characterized by a long-run fiscal policy rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say d, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by seigniorage revenue. The parameter d characterizes the interdependence between fiscal and monetary authorities. It is shown that in a standard monetary economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money. Empirical estimates of d are obtained for OECD countries using data on nominal consumption, monetary base, and debt. Results indicate that debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price level in these economies. Estimates of d correlate well with institutional measures of central bank independence.

Economic Development under Alternative Trade Regimes

How does openness affect economic development? This question is answered in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy, where countries have technological differences that are both sector-neutral and specific to the investment goods sector. Relative to a benchmark case of trade in credit markets only, consider (i) a complete restriction of trade, and (ii) a full liberalization of trade. The first change decreases the cross-sectional dispersion of incomes only slightly, and produces a relatively small welfare loss. The second change, instead, decreases dispersion by a significant amount, and produces a very large welfare gain.

Why Have Aggregate Skilled Hours Become So Cyclical Since the Mid-1980's?

This paper documents and discusses a dramatic change in the cyclical behavior of aggregate hours worked by individuals with a college degree (skilled workers) since the mid-1980’s. Using the CPS outgoing rotation data set for the period 1979:1-2003:4, we find that the volatility of aggregate skilled hours relative to the volatility of GDP has nearly tripled since 1984. In contrast, the cyclical properties of unskilled hours have remained essentially unchanged. We evaluate the extent to which a simple supply/demand model for skilled and unskilled labor with capital-skill complementarity in production can help explain this stylized fact. Within this framework, we identify three effects which would lead to an increase in the relative volatility of skilled hours: (i) a reduction in the degree of capital-skill complementarity, (ii) a reduction in the absolute volatility of GDP (and unskilled hours), and (iii) an increase in the level of capital equipment relative to skilled labor. We provide empirical evidence in support of each of these effects. Our conclusion is that these three mechanisms can jointly explain about sixty percent of the observed increase in the relative volatility of skilled labor. The reduction in the degree of capital-skill complementarity contributes the most to this result.

[E]scape : anonymat et politique à l'ère de la mobilisation globale: passages chinois pour la communauté qui vient

Le thème de la mobilisation totale est au cœur de la réflexion actuelle sur le renouvellement des modes de subjectivation et des manières d’être-ensemble. En arrière-plan, on trouve la question de la compatibilité entre les processus vitaux humains et la modernité, bref, la question de la viabilité du processus de civilisation occidental. Au cœur du diagnostic: l’insuffisance radicale de la fiction de l’homo oeconomicus, modèle de l’individu privé sans liens sociaux et souffrant d’un déficit de sphère. La « communauté qui vient » (Agamben), la « politisation de l’existence » (Lopez Petit) et la création de « sphères régénérées » (Sloterdijk) nomment autant de tentatives pour penser le dépassement de la forme désormais impropre et insensée de l’individualité. Mais comment réaliser ce dépassement? Ou de manière plus précise : quelle traversée pour amener l’individu privé à opérer ce dépassement? Ce doctorat s’organise autour d’une urgence focale : [E]scape. Ce concept suggère un horizon de fuite immanent : il signe une sortie hors de l’individu privé et trace un plan d’idéalité permettant d’effectuer cette sortie. Concrètement, ce concept commande la production d’une série d’analyses théoriques et artistiques portant sur des penseurs contemporains tels que Foucault, Deleuze ou Sloterdijk, l’album Kid A de Radiohead ainsi que sur le cinéma et l’art contemporain chinois (Jia Zhangke, Wong Kar-Wai, Wong Xiaoshuai, Lou Ye, Shu Yong, Huang Rui, Zhang Huan, Zhu Yu, etc.). Ces analyses sont conçues comme autant de passages ou itinéraires de désubjectivation. Elles posent toutes, d’une manière ou d’une autre, le problème du commun et de l’être-ensemble, sur le seuil des non-lieux du capitalisme global. Ces itinéraires se veulent liminaux, c’est-à-dire qu’ils se constituent comme passages sur la ligne d’un dehors et impliquent une mise en jeu éthopoïétique. Sur le plan conceptuel, ils marquent résolument une distance avec le paradigme de la politique identitaire et la critique des représentations interculturelles.

The Economic Effects of Improving Investor Rights in Portugal

The Portuguese economy has performed remarkably well since joining the EU in 1986. Output per worker grew at an annual rate of 2.25%. The relative price of investment has declined. Real investment has increased compared to output, in part fuelled by an increase in capital inflows. At the same time, resource allocation seems to have improved as well: firm-level data shows a significant decline in the dispersion of labor productivity and size across firms. This paper argues that improvements in outside investor rights that have taken place since Portugal joined the EU is a prime candidate to explain this set of facts.

Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development

Poor countries have lower PPP–adjusted investment rates and face higher relative prices of investment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either because these countries have a relatively lower TFP in industries producing capital goods, or because they are subject to greater investment distortions. This paper provides a micro–foundation for the cross–country dispersion in investment distortions. We first document that firms producing capital goods face a higher level of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors’ rights is incomplete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment in the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn, this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods, invest a lower fraction of their income, and end up being poorer. We find that our mechanism may be quantitatively important.

Asset Pricing in a Production Economy with Chew–Dekel Preferences

In this paper we provide a thorough characterization of the asset returns implied by a simple general equilibrium production economy with Chew–Dekel risk preferences and convex capital adjustment costs. When households display levels of disappointment aversion consistent with the experimental evidence, a version of the model parameterized to match the volatility of output and consumption growth generates unconditional expected asset returns and price of risk in line with the historical data. For the model with Epstein–Zin preferences to generate similar statistics, the relative risk aversion coefficient needs to be about 55, two orders of magnitude higher than the available estimates. We argue that this is not surprising, given the limited risk imposed on agents by a reasonably calibrated stochastic growth model.