Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.

Time Reversibility of Stationary Regular Finite State Markov Chains

We propose an alternate parameterization of stationary regular finite-state Markov chains, and a decomposition of the parameter into time reversible and time irreversible parts. We demonstrate some useful properties of the decomposition, and propose an index for a certain type of time irreversibility. Two empirical examples illustrate the use of the proposed parameter, decomposition and index. One involves observed states; the other, latent states.