Youth engagement: the ethics of inclusion and exclusion

This study focuses on the engagement of children and youth in their communities and the ways they are included in and excluded from community life. Using a content analysis of a small town United States newspaper over a one-year period, examples of engagement were identified and classified into 12 categories: programs, clubs and special events; fundraising and community service; business and community support; participation in community events; school events; athletic and other performances; employment; involvement in local planning and decision making; serving as a community representative; visibility and recognition; criminal activity and accidents; and use of public space. Examples of community exclusion were identified as well. Young people were engaged primarily through activities that were adult-directed or supervised, or organized through schools, churches, and youth clubs. There was little involvement in local planning, decision making, or activism. Some evidence existed of peer teaching, leadership, and self-initiated activities, as well as intentional efforts by adults to give youth a greater voice in community activities. Implications include several ethical issues regarding the role of young people in community life, particularly young children, and the need for greater awareness on the part of communities of the contributions young people can make.

Doing Justice to Recognition

The traditional role of justice is to arbitrate where the good will of people is not enough, if even present, to settle a dispute between the concerned parties. It is a procedural approach that assumes a fractured relationship between those involved. Recognition, at first glance, would not seem to mirror these aspects of justice. Yet recognition is very much a subject of justice these days. The aim of this paper is to question the applicability of justice to the practice of recognition. The methodological orientation of this paper is a Kantian-style critique of the institution of justice, highlighting the limits of its reach and the dangers of overextension. The critique unfolds in the following three steps: 1) There is an immediate appeal to justice as a practice of recognition through its commitment to universality. This allure is shown to be deceptive in providing no prescription for the actual practice of this universality. 2) The interventionist character of justice is designed to address divided relationships. If recognition is only given expression through this channel, then we can only assume division as our starting ground. 3) The outcome of justice in respect to recognition is identification. This identification is left vulnerable to misrecognition itself, creating a cycle of injustice that demands recognition from anew. It seems to be well accepted that recognition is essentjustice, but less clear how to do justice to recognition. This paper is an effort in clarification.

An Ethic of Connectedness: Book Review of The Connected Self: The Ethics and Governance of the Genetic Individual

Compte-rendu / Review