Le fichage de la délinquance sexuelle : une érosion des principes de justice criminelle et punitive

Dans ce mémoire, nous examinons le fichage de la délinquance sexuelle dont les divers régimes juridiques reposent sur l’idée que ces contrevenants présentent un risque réel de récidive criminelle. Les données scientifiques sur la délinquance sexuelle relativisent ce risque et attestent qu’il est quasi absent dans un très grand nombre de cas. Il existe donc une dichotomie entre les prémisses du droit et les connaissances issues des sciences sociales et humaines sur cette question. Le fichage de cette délinquance au Canada donne lieu à des mécanismes administratifs provinciaux en plus d’un régime fédéral contenu au Code criminel. Nous émettons l’hypothèse que le fichage provincial emporte de véritables conséquences pénales sur les délinquants sexuels, affectent leurs droits en vertu de l’article 7 de la Charte et contrecarre des principes de justice fondamentale. Ensuite, nous examinons le régime fédéral intégré au Code criminel et nous argumentons que ce mécanisme juridique crée une mesure punitive de la nature d’une peine. Par conséquent, le fichage fédéral devrait être aménagé de façon à satisfaire aux garanties constitutionnelles propres à la peine et aux principes généraux de la détermination de la peine en vertu de la Partie XXIII du Code criminel. Nous concluons que les législateurs successifs ont créé des régimes juridiques régissant le fichage de la délinquance sexuelle en écartant les principes fondamentaux administratifs, criminels et constitutionnels qui devraient présider à l’élaboration des règles concernant ce stigmate de la criminalité. Les tribunaux, par leur interprétation, ont également déqualifié cette stigmatisation de la criminalité sexuelle à titre de peine. Le droit relatif au fichage de la délinquance sexuelle donne donc lieu à une érosion des principes fondamentaux de la justice criminelle et punitive.

On cultural property and its protection: a law-and-economics comment

The term cultural property seems to have come into vogue after the Second World War as part of efforts to prevent the recurrence of the massive war-time destruction of objects of cultural significance to various groups and, in some cases, to all of humanity. The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict symbolises those efforts. Destruction is not the only doomsday scenario for cultural property. Removal of objects from their owners or region of origin is another concern. This, too, had occurred during the Second World War with the nazis’ looting treasures of all kinds from occupied territories, not to mention the massive confiscation of the property of their Jewish victims everywhere. But the concern was older, as Merryman for one shows in the story of the Elgin marbles, brought from Greece to England during the 19th century. This concern has found expression in a 1970 UNESCO treaty and in a 1995 Unidroit Convention seeking to halt international traffic in cultural property.

The law and economics of good faith in the civil law of contract

Good faith plays a central role in most legal systems, yet appears to be an intractable concept. This article proposes to analyse it economically as the absence of opportunism in circumstances which lend themselves to it. One of the objectives underlying the law of contract on an economic view is to curtail opportunism. In spelling out what this means, the paper proposes a three-step test: bad faith is present where a substantial informational or other asymmetry exists between the parties, which one of them turns into an undue advantage, considered against the gains both parties could normally expect to realise through the contract, and where loss to the disadvantaged party is so serious as to provoke recourse to expensive self-protection, which significantly raises transactions costs in the market. The three-step test is then used to analyse a set of recent decisions in international commercial transactions and three concepts derived from good faith: fraud, warranty for latent defects and lesion.

The Law and Economics of the Civil Law of Mandate

Présentation à la Annual Law & Economics Conference 2007, Université de Bologne.

The Social Power of Bodin's 'Sovereignty' and International Law

The word ‘sovereignty’ provides a forceful example of the social power of language as an organic instrument playing a leading role in the continuous and continuing process of creating and transforming human reality. The paper examines a pivotal episode in the history of the word ‘sovereignty’ — its formal introduction in the 16th century by Jean Bodin in his Six Livres de la Republique. It focuses on the social effects ‘sovereignty’ has had on the shared consciousness of humanity, including that of the international community. The proposed metalogical inquiry adopts a method that draws from the hermeneutic school of historical knowledge. The argument is that Bodin used ‘sovereignty’ for the purpose of attributing to the ruler (the French king) supreme power in the hierarchical organisational structure of society. This idea of a pyramid of authority is found in different elements of the discourse in Six Livres de la Republique, which is examined in the immediate context of Bodin’s personal background as well as the extended social, political and intellectual context of 16th century France. The conclusion shows that Bodin’s work was the first seminal step in the development of contemporary ideas of ‘internal sovereignty’ and ‘external sovereignty’. It is thus part of the history of the true power that the word at hand has exercised in framing the international state system and hence the international legal system.

Two models of constitutionalism and the legitimacy of law : Dicey or Marshall ?

The article was first published in the Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal.

General Legitimacy of Judicial Review and the Fundamental Basis of Constitutional Law

Four questions dominate normative contemporary constitutional theroy: What is the purpose of a constitution? What makes a constitution legitimate? What kinds of arguments are legitimate within the process of constitutional interpretation? What can make judicial review of legislation legitimate in principle? The main purpose of this text is to provide one general answer to the last question. The secondary purpose is to show how this answer may bear upon our understanding of the fundamental basis of constitutional law. These two purposes should suggest particular answers to the first three questions.

Security and Securities in English Commercial Law

Paul Latimer, Associate Professor, Department of Business Law and Taxation. Faculty of Business and Economics, Monash University. Présentation dans le cadre du cycle de conférences organisé par le CRDP intitulé « Le droit à la sécurité ... la sécurité par le droit ».