Career Officers and Political Appointees in American Diplomacy: Contending for Diplomatic Positions through Boundary Work

American Political and Economic Series

Does IMF Induce Political Business Cycles? An Empirical Analysis on Latin America's Indebted Countries.

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On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously

Although Insurers Face Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard When They Set Insurance Contracts, These Two Types of Asymmetrical Information Have Been Given Separate Treatments Sofar in the Economic Literature. This Paper Is a First Attempt to Integrate Both Problems Into a Single Model. We Show How It Is Possible to Use Time in Order to Achieve a First-Best Allocation of Risks When Both Problems Are Present Simultaneously.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

Finite-Sample Simulation-Based Inference in VAR Models with Applications to Order Selection and Causality Testing

Statistical tests in vector autoregressive (VAR) models are typically based on large-sample approximations, involving the use of asymptotic distributions or bootstrap techniques. After documenting that such methods can be very misleading even with fairly large samples, especially when the number of lags or the number of equations is not small, we propose a general simulation-based technique that allows one to control completely the level of tests in parametric VAR models. In particular, we show that maximized Monte Carlo tests [Dufour (2002)] can provide provably exact tests for such models, whether they are stationary or integrated. Applications to order selection and causality testing are considered as special cases. The technique developed is applied to quarterly and monthly VAR models of the U.S. economy, comprising income, money, interest rates and prices, over the period 1965-1996.

SCaFoS: a tool for Selection, Concatenation and Fusion of Sequences for phylogenomics

Affiliation: Département de Biochimie, Université de Montréal

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 1: THE ZOLLVEREIN AND RAILWAYS..

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 2: THE SHARE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY..

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Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

Src family kinases are required for limb trajectory selection by spinal motor axons

Signal relay by guidance receptors at the axonal growth cone is a process essential for the assembly of a functional nervous system. We investigated the in vivo function of Src family kinases (SFKs) as growth cone guidance signaling intermediates in the context of spinal lateral motor column (LMC) motor axon projection toward the ventral or dorsal limb mesenchyme. Using in situ mRNA detection we determined that Src and Fyn are expressed in LMC motor neurons of chick and mouse embryos at the time of limb trajectory selection. Inhibition of SFK activity by C-terminal Src kinase (Csk) overexpression in chickLMCaxons using in ovo electroporation resulted inLMC axons selecting the inappropriate dorsoventral trajectory within the limb mesenchyme, with medial LMC axon projecting into the dorsal and ventral limb nerve with apparently random incidence. We also detected LMC axon trajectory choice errors in Src mutant mice demonstrating a nonredundant role for Src in motor axon guidance in agreement with gain and loss of Src function in chickLMCneurons which led to the redirection ofLMCaxons. Finally, Csk-mediated SFK inhibition attenuated the retargeting ofLMCaxons caused by EphA or EphB over-expression, implying the participation of SFKs in Eph-mediated LMC motor axon guidance. In summary, our findings demonstrate that SFKs are essential for motor axon guidance and suggest that they play an important role in relaying ephrin:Eph signals that mediate the selection of motor axon trajectory in the limb.