Swimming upstream: navigating ethical practices in the creation of a participatory youth media workshop

Despite the growing popularity of participatory video as a tool for facilitating youth empowerment, the methodology and impacts of the practice are extremely understudied. This paper describes a study design created to examine youth media methodology and the ethical dilemmas that arose in its attempted implementation. Specifically, elements that added “rigor” to the study (i.e., randomization, pre- and post-measures, and an intensive interview) conflicted with the fundamental tenets of youth participation. The paper concludes with suggestions for studying participatory media methodologies that are more in line with an ethics of participation.

Growing up expectations. Better understanding the expectations of community partners in participatory action research projects

This paper challenges the assumption that youth and youth agencies are in a condition of equality when entering a participatory action research (PAR). By asserting that it is not a state of equality that practitioners nor youth should assume nor be immediately striving for, but a consistently equitable process, this article draws from and reflects on the relationship between young people and researchers who have used a PAR methodology in action oriented projects. Using the UNESCO Growing up in Cities Canada project as a case example, this review extrapolates from and reflects on challenges faced by the project as a whole. Using semi-structured interviews to explore the roles of adults and youth, a number of strategies are highlighted as the techniques used to overcome these challenges. The discussion concludes with further reflection on the complexities of equality and equity, recommending a number of actions that have the potential to create an equitable environment in PAR projects similar to the one examined.

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed as indirect egalitarian equivalence).