La preuve ontologique de l'existence de Dieu chez Descartes

Ce projet de mémoire de maîtrise portera sur Descartes et la preuve dite "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu. La présentation qui sera faite de cette preuve, de ses tenants et de ses aboutissants, tiendra compte: premièrement, du rôle et du statut de celle-ci dans l'ordre des raisons métaphysiques; deuxièmement, des relations entre la preuve "ontologique" et la preuve dite "par les effets"; et troisièmement, des différentes oeuvres de Descartes dans lesquelles il est question de l'argument ontologique. Ainsi, cette analyse permettra de noter les différences relatives qu'il pourrait y avoir chez Descartes quant au fond ou à la forme de cet argument. Nous évoquerons notamment la position différente qu'occupe cette preuve dans deux écrits, soient les Méditations métaphysiques (1641) et les Principes de la philosophie (1644). Ce genre d'analyse nous permettra de nous pencher sur le débat initié par Martial Guéroult et Henri Gouhier concernant la place de la preuve "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu au sein de l'ordre des raisons métaphysiques ainsi que ses relations avec la preuve "par les effets". La postérité de ce débat sera également considérée. Aussi, nous serons à même de poser la question à savoir s'il y a une évolution de la preuve "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu au fil des oeuvres dans la pensée de Descartes. En résumé, dans ce mémoire, nous aborderons deux problématiques: la question de l'autonomie ou de la non autonomie de la preuve "ontologique" par rapport à la preuve "par les effets", et le questionnement quant à la possibilité d'une évolution de la place et de la nature de la preuve dite "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu dans les écrits de Descartes.

Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Strategy-proof tie-breaking

We study a general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders and identify conditions under which there exists a strategy-proof mechanism which always chooses an agent-optimal stable, or constrained efficient, matching. A priority structure for which these two requirements are compatible is called solvable. For the general class of priority-based allocation problems with weak priority orders,we introduce three simple necessary conditions on the priority structure. We show that these conditions completely characterize solvable environments within the class of indifferences at the bottom (IB) environments, where ties occur only at the bottom of the priority structure. This generalizes and unifies previously known results on solvable and unsolvable environments established in school choice, housing markets and house allocation with existing tenants. We show how the previously known solvable cases can be viewed as extreme cases of solvable environments. For sufficiency of our conditions we introduce a version of the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with exogenous and preference-based tie-breaking.

«Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the groves mechanisms»

A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter infinite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family.

Strategy-proof preference aggregation

An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never produces a social ordering that is strictly between the original ordering and one’s own preference. After describing a few examples of manipulable rules, we study in some detail three classes of strategy-proof rules: (i)rules based on a monotonic alteration of the majority relation generated by the preference profile; (ii)rules improving upon a fixed status-quo; and (iii) rules generalizing the Condorcet-Kemeny aggregation method.

Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study

We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the world or her valuation of the outcomes; it is ex-post efficient if the act selected at any given preference profile picks a Pareto-efficient outcome in every state of the world. We show that every two-agent ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rule is a top selection: the chosen act picks the most preferred outcome of some (possibly different) agent in every state of the world. The states in which an agent’s top outcome is selected cannot vary with the reported valuations of the outcomes but may change with the reported beliefs. We give a complete characterization of the ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rules in the two-agent, two-state case, and we identify a rich class of such rules in the two-agent case.