La gouvernance des projets d’architecture : une typologie de la multi-organisation temporaire

Les débats éthiques sur l’architecture ont traditionnellement abordé trois thématiques récurrentes : la beauté, la solidité et l’utilité de l’œuvre architecturale. Plus récemment, les nouvelles connaissances provenant du domaine de la gestion des projets et du développement durable ont apporté d’importantes contributions à la compréhension de la gouvernance de projets. Cependant, la démarche de réalisation des projets d’architecture est tributaire des caractéristiques propres à l’industrie du bâtiment; une industrie qui fonctionne grâce à la mise en place d’équipes temporaires formées par des organisations hautement spécialisées. L’analyse systémique d’études de cas permet d’identifier la complexité des équipes qui interviennent dans les projets d’architecture. Nous examinons dans cet article trois caractéristiques de l’industrie du bâtiment : (i) la complexité organisationnelle du donneur d’ouvrage, (ii) l’influence des parties prenantes, et (iii) les divers niveaux de proximité entre l’architecte et les usagers. L’identification des diverses configurations organisationnelles met en évidence les effets de ces caractéristiques sur les relations formelles et informelles entre l’architecte et les donneurs d’ouvrage ainsi que celles entre toutes les parties prenantes. L’architecte est contraint de travailler sur un projet qui devient, de plus en plus, l’objet de négociation entre les diverses parties prenantes. Face à ce défi, il doit tenir compte de la complexité des relations entre tous les acteurs au sein du système social du projet et créer les scénarios adéquats à la participation, à la négociation et aux échanges entre eux.

International Transmission of the Business Cycle in a Multi-Sector Model.

Multi-country models have not been very successful in replicating important features of the international transmission of business cycles. Standard models predict cross-country correlations of output and consumption which are respectively too low and too high. In this paper, we build a multi-country model of the business cycle with multiple sectors in order to analyze the role of sectoral shocks in the international transmission of the business cycle. We find that a model with multiple sectors generates a higher cross-country correlation of output than standard one-sector models, and a lower cross-country correlation of consumption. In addition, it predicts cross-country correlations of employment and investment that are closer to the data than the standard model. We also analyze the relative effects of multiple sectors, trade in intermediate goods, imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods, home preference, capital adjustment costs, and capital depreciation on the international transmission of the business cycle.

Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem : A Multi-Profile Approach with Variable-Population Extensions

This paper provides new versions of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem that are formulated in terms of prospects rather than lotteries. Strengthening an earlier result, fixed-population ex-ante utilitarianism is characterized in a multi-profile setting with fixed probabilities. In addition, we extend the social aggregation theorem to social-evaluation problems under uncertainty with a variable population and generalize our approach to uncertain alternatives, which consist of compound vectors of probability distributions and prospects.

Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent announces a vector of bids, one for each possible project, that are constrained to sum up to zero. In addition, each agent chooses a favorite a object which is used as a tie-breaker if several projects receive the same highest aggregate bid. Since more desirable projects receive larger bids, it is natural to consider the multi-bidding mechanism without the announcement of favorite projects. We show that the merits of the multi-bidding mechanism appear not to be robust to this natural simplification. Specifically, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if there are at least two individually optimal projects and all individually optimal projects are efficient.

The Transmission of Monetary Policy in a Multi-Sector Economy

This paper constructs and estimates a sticky-price, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with heterogenous production sectors. Sectors differ in price stickiness, capital-adjustment costs and production technology, and use output from each other as material and investment inputs following an Input-Output Matrix and Capital Flow Table that represent the U.S. economy. By relaxing the standard assumption of symmetry, this model allows different sectoral dynamics in response to monetary policy shocks. The model is estimated by Simulated Method of Moments using sectoral and aggregate U.S. time series. Results indicate 1) substantial heterogeneity in price stickiness across sectors, with quantitatively larger differences between services and goods than previously found in micro studies that focus on final goods alone, 2) a strong sensitivity to monetary policy shocks on the part of construction and durable manufacturing, and 3) similar quantitative predictions at the aggregate level by the multi-sector model and a standard model that assumes symmetry across sectors.