The Gaia Commission: Climate Change and Moral Responsibility

Travail créatif / Creative Work

Moral Responsibility in the Context of Prenatal Testing: What can be Expected?

Commentaire / Commentary

Implementing Revisionism: Assessing a Revisionist Theory of Moral Responsibility

The aim of this paper is to examine a particular substantive theory among others in the set of “revisionist” theories of moral responsibility, namely, Manuel Vargas’ version of the moral influence account of the justification of responsibility- specific practices. Moderate revisionism, which Vargas (2005) endorses, advocates a clear distinction between descriptive and normative questions, which enables a naturalistically plausible account of responsibility that does not jeopardize the normative aspect. However, while Vargas provides a useful framework for thinking about revisionism, I argue that despite its initial appeal, an actual revisionist theory does not seem to track as closely as we would like what I call the “meta-theory” of revisionism, viz. what Vargas defines as the features of moderate revisionism. Outlining these differences enables the formulation of observations about 1) the role of revisionist approaches for theorizing about moral responsibility and 2) how revisionism can be integrated with scientifically informed approaches.

Moral Loopholes in the Global Economic Environment: Why Well-Intentioned Organizations Act in Harmful Ways

Thomas Pogge’s notion of moral loopholes serves to provide support for two claims: first, that the ethical code of the global economic order contains moral loopholes that allow participants in special social arrangements to reduce their obligations to those outside the social arrangement, which leads to morally objectionable actions for which no party feels responsible and that are also counterproductive to the overall objective of the economic system; and, second, that these moral loopholes are more likely to exist as our economic order becomes more global. Finally, it will be shown that attempts to rectify the situation with voluntary corporate codes of conduct are inadequate. The argument proceeds through analysis of one case study, concerning action by the executive of the Cerrejón mining operation at La Guajira Penisular, Colombia.

Moral Loopholes in the Global Economic Environment: Why Well-Intentioned Organizations Act in Harmful Ways

Thomas Pogge’s notion of moral loopholes serves to provide support for two claims: first, that the ethical code of the global economic order contains moral loopholes that allow participants in special social arrangements to reduce their obligations to those outside the social arrangement, which leads to morally objectionable actions for which no party feels responsible and that are also counterproductive to the overall objective of the economic system; and, second, that these moral loopholes are more likely to exist as our economic order becomes more global. Finally, it will be shown that attempts to rectify the situation with voluntary corporate codes of conduct are inadequate. The argument proceeds through analysis of one case study, concerning action by the executive of the Cerrejón mining operation at La Guajira Penisular, Colombia.

Moral Loopholes in the Global Economic Environment: Why Well-Intentioned Organizations Act in Harmful Ways

Thomas Pogge’s notion of moral loopholes serves to provide support for two claims: first, that the ethical code of the global economic order contains moral loopholes that allow participants in special social arrangements to reduce their obligations to those outside the social arrangement, which leads to morally objectionable actions for which no party feels responsible and that are also counterproductive to the overall objective of the economic system; and, second, that these moral loopholes are more likely to exist as our economic order becomes more global. Finally, it will be shown that attempts to rectify the situation with voluntary corporate codes of conduct are inadequate. The argument proceeds through analysis of one case study, concerning action by the executive of the Cerrejón mining operation at La Guajira Penisular, Colombia.

Les contre-exemples de Frankfurt ratent leur cible : un nouveau heaume pour le principe des possibilités alternatives

Les contre-exemples de Frankfurt sont inoffensifs contre l’argument de la conséquence (consequence argument), l’argument qui, à partir du principe des possibilités alternatives et du déterminisme, montre que nous ne pouvons être tenus moralement responsables de nos actions. En effet, ils sont formulés soit dans un cadre déterministe, soit dans un cadre indéterministe. S’ils sont formulés dans un cadre indéterministe, ils sont inoffensifs parce qu’ils contreviennent à un principe méthodologique que nous défendons : le principe de non-négation des prémisses (PNNP). En fait, nous montrons que pour tout argument donné, il est proscrit de supposer la négation d’une prémisse afin de réfuter une autre prémisse à moins que l’attaque réussisse à réfuter les deux prémisses en question. Or, d’une part, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt indéterministes supposent explicitement qu’une prémisse de l’argument de la conséquence – le déterminisme est vrai – est fausse; et d’autre part, ils ne peuvent pas nous donner de raisons de croire en l’indéterminisme, ce que nous montrons grâce à des considérations sur la transmission de la justification. Construire des contre-exemples de Frankfurt indéterministes est donc incorrect pour des raisons méthodologiques et logiques. S’ils sont formulés dans un cadre déterministe, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt font face à une autre accusation d’entorse argumentative, présentée dans la défense du dilemme (Dilemma Defence) de Kane-Ginet-Widerker : celle de la pétition de principe. Nous inspectons et nuançons cette accusation, mais concluons qu’elle tient puisque les contre-exemples de Frankfurt déterministes supposent au final une analyse des agents contrefactuels dans les mondes déterministes et de la relation « rendre inévitable » que ne peuvent endosser ni les incompatibilistes de la marge de manœuvre (leeway incompatibilists), ni les incompatibilistes de la source (source incompatibilists) ni non plus les semicompatibilistes. Conséquemment, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt ne peuvent plus soutenir la forme de compatibilisme à laquelle ils ont donné naissance. L’incompatibilisme de la source ne peut plus être préféré à l’incompatibilisme de la marge de manœuvre ni non plus rejeter toute participation des possibilités alternatives dans l’explication de la responsabilité morale sur cette seule base.

Judging Culpability in Dwyer’s Climate Change “Gaia Commission”: A Response to Dwyer

Commentaire / Commentary

Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously

Although Insurers Face Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard When They Set Insurance Contracts, These Two Types of Asymmetrical Information Have Been Given Separate Treatments Sofar in the Economic Literature. This Paper Is a First Attempt to Integrate Both Problems Into a Single Model. We Show How It Is Possible to Use Time in Order to Achieve a First-Best Allocation of Risks When Both Problems Are Present Simultaneously.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Assurance-chômage, hasard moral et estimation du modèle de hasard proportionnel via le principe d'entropie généralisée.

Rapport de recherche

Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia.

In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.