The Uneasy History of Lotteries

While the Present Popularity of Lotteries and the Ferocious Attacks They Are the Object of Would Induce One to Think They Are a Novelty, Lotteries Already Existed At the Dawn of History. in This Paper, We Will Give a Brief Historical Survey of Games of Chance, with Special Emphasis on Lotteries. This Survey Serves As a Background for Forthcoming Studies Where We Examine Why They Were Frequently Popular And, At the Same Time, the Object of the Scorn of a Number of Would-Be Reformers.

Expenditures on Lotteries: What Do People Say and Wht They Do? a Econometric Analysis.

Underdeclarations Are Typical When Alcohol, Tobacco and Gambling Consumptions Are Questioned in Surveys. Recent Surveys on Expenditures on Lotteries Have Similar Problems: the Declared Expenditures Equal Between 60 to 65 Percent of the Revenues of the Various State-Run Lottery Entreprises. by Using the Relatively Accurate Data on the Revenue Side of This Industry One Can Deal with the Problem of Underdeclarations of Consumption Patterns in Suveys and Obtain Better Income Elasticity Estimates. the Statistical Analysis Permits to Test Specific Hypotheses on a Lottery Model Developed by Brenner, and Suggests Broader Implications Both for Future Econometric Analysis and the Confidence One Gives to Elasticity Estimates Derived From Aggregate Sectorial Data for All Consumption Expenditures.

Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem : A Multi-Profile Approach with Variable-Population Extensions

This paper provides new versions of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem that are formulated in terms of prospects rather than lotteries. Strengthening an earlier result, fixed-population ex-ante utilitarianism is characterized in a multi-profile setting with fixed probabilities. In addition, we extend the social aggregation theorem to social-evaluation problems under uncertainty with a variable population and generalize our approach to uncertain alternatives, which consist of compound vectors of probability distributions and prospects.

Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of (0-1) normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule and discuss related criteria.