Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Towards a Methodology for Assessing the Legal Risks Associated with Cyberjustice

Présentation du professeur Karim Benyekhlef, lors du Congrès annuel de l'Institut canadien de l'administration de la justice (ICAJ) intitulé « Règlement des conflits : la justice n'appartient-elle qu'aux tribunaux ? ». Le panel auquel il participait : « La cyber justice - Les tribunaux virtuels ». Disponible en français et en anglais (avec commentaires).

Warning Patients’ Relatives of Genetic Risks: Policy Approaches

As an increasing number of genetic tests for specific early- and late-onset disorders move from research to the clinical setting, health care professionals are faced with new challenges or, alternatively, with novel twists on age-old ethical dilemmas. A finding that an individual carries a deleterious mutation can indicate that his or her relatives are at an increased risk of being affected by the same genetic disorder.

A model of dynamic liquidity contracts

I study long-term financial contracts between lenders and borrowers in the absence of perfect enforceability and when both parties are credit constrained. Borrowers repeatedly have projects to undertake and need external financing. Lenders can commit to contractual agreements whereas borrowers can renege any period. I show that equilibrium contracts feature interesting dynamics: the economy exhibits efficient investment cycles; absence of perfect enforcement and shortage of capital skew the cycles toward states of liquidity drought; credit is rationed if either the lender has too little capital or if the borrower has too little collateral. This paper's technical contribution is its demonstration of the existence and characterization of financial contracts that are solutions to a non-convex dynamic programming problem.

Ethique du policy maker et dynamique macroéconomique en régime de Currency Board : le cas de Djibouti

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Liquidity traps, capital flows

This paper explores the role of capital flows and exchange rate dynamics in shaping the global economy's adjustment in a liquidity trap. Using a multi-country model with nominal rigidities, we shed light on the global adjustment since the Great Recession, a period where many advanced economies were pushed to the zero bound on interest rates. We establish three main results: (i) When the North hits the zero bound, downstream capital flows alleviate the recession by reallocating demand to the South and switching expenditure toward North goods. (ii) A free capital flow regime falls short of supporting efficient demand and expenditure reallocations and induces too little downstream (upstream) flows during (after) the liquidity trap. (iii) When it comes to capital flow management, individual countries' incentives to manage their terms of trade conflict with aggregate demand stabilization and global efficiency. This underscores the importance of international policy coordination in liquidity trap episodes.