Ambiguity on the insurer's side: the demand for insurance

Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.

Ambiguity on the insurer's side: the demand for insurance

Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.

La subrogation légale de l’assureur en vertu du Code civil : historique, développements et aspects procéduraux

En assurance de dommages, l’article 2474 C.c.Q. prévoit la possibilité pour l’assureur d’être légalement subrogé dans les droits de l’assuré contre l’auteur du préjudice, à concurrence des indemnités qu’il a payées. L’assureur ne pourra jamais être subrogé contre les personnes faisant partie de la maison de l’assuré. Dans un premier temps, le présent mémoire fait un survol historique du droit à la subrogation de l’assureur en vertu du Code civil. Depuis la codification de 1865, les principes relatifs à la subrogation de l’assureur ne sont pas demeurés statiques. Ils firent l’objet de plusieurs modifications législatives et de nombreuses controverses et développements jurisprudentiels. Dans un deuxième temps, un portrait global de l’état actuel du droit est dressé en ce qui concerne l’article 2474 C.c.Q., tant sur le plan des composantes du droit à la subrogation que de ses aspects procéduraux.