47 resultados para Inégalité
em Université de Montréal, Canada
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Rapport de recherche
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Rapport de recherche
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Rapport de recherche
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Soit p un polynôme d'une variable complexe z. On peut trouver plusieurs inégalités reliant le module maximum de p et une combinaison de ses coefficients. Dans ce mémoire, nous étudierons principalement les preuves connues de l'inégalité de Visser. Nous montrerons aussi quelques généralisations de cette inégalité. Finalement, nous obtiendrons quelques applications de l'inégalité de Visser à l'inégalité de Chebyshev.
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Bien qu'il soit désormais établi que les institutions du travail (tel que la syndicalisation et le salaire minimum) aient eu pour effet de réduire l'inégalité des salaires entre les travailleurs au Canada et dans d'autres pays industrialisés, leur impact sur l'inégalité des revenus entre les familles ou les ménages reste incertain. Cette étude a pour but d'estimer l'impact de la densité syndicale et du salaire minimum réel sur l'évolution de l'inégalité des revenus de marché entre les ménages canadiens durant les années 1981 à 2008. À partir d'une base de données qui intègre des données annuelles agrégées par province, et en maintenant constant un ensemble de facteurs, les estimations par effets fixes indiquent que la densité syndicale a réduit l'inégalité des revenus mesurée au moyen du coefficient de Gini, alors que le salaire minimum réel a plutôt eu pour effet d'accroître celle-ci. Les résultats d'estimation indiquent également que le taux d'activité et la scolarité moyenne sont les principaux facteurs à avoir réduit l'inégalité des revenus, alors que le taux de chômage, le changement technologique (mesuré de différentes façons) et l'immigration récente ont contribué à l'accroître.
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Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.
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Rapport de recherche présenté à la Faculté des arts et des sciences en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en sciences économiques.
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This paper proposes finite-sample procedures for testing the SURE specification in multi-equation regression models, i.e. whether the disturbances in different equations are contemporaneously uncorrelated or not. We apply the technique of Monte Carlo (MC) tests [Dwass (1957), Barnard (1963)] to obtain exact tests based on standard LR and LM zero correlation tests. We also suggest a MC quasi-LR (QLR) test based on feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). We show that the latter statistics are pivotal under the null, which provides the justification for applying MC tests. Furthermore, we extend the exact independence test proposed by Harvey and Phillips (1982) to the multi-equation framework. Specifically, we introduce several induced tests based on a set of simultaneous Harvey/Phillips-type tests and suggest a simulation-based solution to the associated combination problem. The properties of the proposed tests are studied in a Monte Carlo experiment which shows that standard asymptotic tests exhibit important size distortions, while MC tests achieve complete size control and display good power. Moreover, MC-QLR tests performed best in terms of power, a result of interest from the point of view of simulation-based tests. The power of the MC induced tests improves appreciably in comparison to standard Bonferroni tests and, in certain cases, outperforms the likelihood-based MC tests. The tests are applied to data used by Fischer (1993) to analyze the macroeconomic determinants of growth.
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This paper examines several families of population principles in the light of a set of axioms. In addition to the critical-level utilitarian, number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian and number-dampened families and their generalized counterparts, we consider the restricted number-dampened family (suggested by Hurka) and introduce two new families : the restricted critical-level and restricted number-dependent critical-level families. Subsets of the restricted families have nonnegative critical levels and avoid both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions but fail to satisfy an important independence condition. We defend the critical-level principles with positive critical levels.
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We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.
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Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of performing variable-population comparisons are required. We review several important axioms for welfarist population principles and discuss the link between individual well-being and the desirability of adding a new person to a given society.
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We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.
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We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”
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Social exclusion manifests itself in the lack of an individual’s access to functionings as compared to other members of society. Thus, the concept is closely related to deprivation. We view deprivation as having two basic determinants: the lack of identification with other members of society and the aggregate alienation experienced by an agent with respect to those with fewer functioning failures. We use an axiomatic approach to characterize classes of deprivation and exclusion measures and apply some of them to EU data for the period from 1994 to 2000.