Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously

Although Insurers Face Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard When They Set Insurance Contracts, These Two Types of Asymmetrical Information Have Been Given Separate Treatments Sofar in the Economic Literature. This Paper Is a First Attempt to Integrate Both Problems Into a Single Model. We Show How It Is Possible to Use Time in Order to Achieve a First-Best Allocation of Risks When Both Problems Are Present Simultaneously.

Could the Asian Crisis Have Been More Accurately Predicted? Improving and Early Warning System Model.

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Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia.

In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.

Warning Patients’ Relatives of Genetic Risks: Policy Approaches

As an increasing number of genetic tests for specific early- and late-onset disorders move from research to the clinical setting, health care professionals are faced with new challenges or, alternatively, with novel twists on age-old ethical dilemmas. A finding that an individual carries a deleterious mutation can indicate that his or her relatives are at an increased risk of being affected by the same genetic disorder.