Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously

Although Insurers Face Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard When They Set Insurance Contracts, These Two Types of Asymmetrical Information Have Been Given Separate Treatments Sofar in the Economic Literature. This Paper Is a First Attempt to Integrate Both Problems Into a Single Model. We Show How It Is Possible to Use Time in Order to Achieve a First-Best Allocation of Risks When Both Problems Are Present Simultaneously.

Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia.

In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.

TONGA : un algorithme de gradient naturel pour les problèmes de grande taille

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Gradient artérioveineux et concentrations interstitielles des bloqueurs neuromusculaires au niveau du muscle : impact sur la modélisation pharmacocinétique-pharmacodynamique

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.