Décentralisation financière et pays en dévelopement: concepts, mesure et évaluation

Ce texte présente ce qu’est la décentralisation fiscale, fait ressortir ses forces et ses faiblesses et identifie les raisons de son succès, le tout dans le contexte de huit pays en développement en faisant appel à de l’information sur l’Argentine, la Chine, la Colombie, l’Inde, l’Indonésie, le Maroc, le Pakistan et la Tunisie. Le texte est divisé en trois parties. La première expose les concepts pertinents, la seconde présente un certain nombre d’indicateurs quantitatifs et la troisième évalue les conditions de succès de la décentralisation.

The Backing of Government Debt and the Price Level

This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies, and their joint role in the determination of the price level. The government is characterized by a long-run fiscal policy rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say d, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by seigniorage revenue. The parameter d characterizes the interdependence between fiscal and monetary authorities. It is shown that in a standard monetary economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money. Empirical estimates of d are obtained for OECD countries using data on nominal consumption, monetary base, and debt. Results indicate that debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price level in these economies. Estimates of d correlate well with institutional measures of central bank independence.

Assessing the Social Acceptability of New Technologies: Gaps and Tensions Between Science and Regulation

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Credibility and Signaling in Disinflation- a Cross Country Examination

This paper develops a model of money demand where the opportunity cost of holding money is subject to regime changes. The regimes are fully characterized by the mean and variance of inflation and are assumed to be the result of alternative government policies. Agents are unable to directly observe whether government actions are indeed consistent with the inflation rate targeted as part of a stabilization program but can construct probability inferences on the basis of available observations of inflation and money growth. Government announcements are assumed to provide agents with additional, possibly truthful information regarding the regime. This specification is estimated and tested using data from the Israeli and Argentine high inflation periods. Results indicate the successful stabilization program implemented in Israel in July 1985 was more credible than either the earlier Israeli attempt in November 1984 or the Argentine programs. Government’s signaling might substantially simplify the inference problem and increase the speed of learning on the part of the agents. However, under certain conditions, it might increase the volatility of inflation. After the introduction of an inflation stabilization plan, the welfare gains from a temporary increase in real balances might be high enough to induce agents to raise their real balances in the short-term, even if they are uncertain about the nature of government policy and the eventual outcome of the stabilization attempt. Statistically, the model restrictions cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level.

Exploring TERRA (TElomeric Repeat-containing RNA) Expression and Regulation During Cell Growth in Saccharomyces cerevisiae

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